PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA

GOVERNMENT ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY

AGCE PKI

Government Certification Authority CP/CPS

APPROVED

Document management

Information

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Document Signoff

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V1.2	01/10/2021	AGCE	AGCE (PKI GB) 11/10/2021	ANCE (PMA) 12 / 10 / 2021

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1 Introduction

The present Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (hereinafter, CP/CPS) of the **Governmental Certification Authority of Algeria** (hereinafter, GOV-CA) applies to the certification services of the GOV-CA.

This CP/CPS adopts international, WebTrust and CA/Browser Forum Guidelines targeted at trustworthy systems dealing with publicly trusted PKI certification services.

This CP/CPS complies with the formal requirements of Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [RFC 3647] with regard to format and content. While certain clause titles are included according to the structure of [RFC 3647], the topic may not necessarily apply in the implementation of the PKI services of the GOV-CA. Such clauses are denoted as "clause not applicable".

The CP/CPS complies with the Algerian law No. 15-04 meant to regulate digital certification services in Algeria. Moreover, it defers to existing and internationally recognized standards, and references clauses from these standards, wherever it is relevant.

The CP/CPS addresses the technical, procedural and organisational policies and practices of the GOV-CA with regard to all services available during the lifetime of certificates issued by the GOV-CA.

The CP/CPS is public. Wherever confidential information is referenced herein, the text refers to classified documentation that is available to authorised persons only.

Further information with regard to this CP/CPS and the GOV-CA can be obtained from the PKI Governance Board (PK GB), using contact information provided in clause 1.5.

1.1 Overview

The Algeria National PKI is implemented as two separate PKI domains (Government and Commercial) established under the Algeria NR-CA. With this National PKI, the Algerian Government aims to provide a framework to facilitate the establishment of Trust Service Providers (TSP) offering digital certification and trust services to government and non-government entities.

The Algeria PKI hierarchy comprises a hierarchy of Certification Authorities (CAs).

The NR-CA sits at the top level of the hierarchy and acts as the trust point (anchor) for the Algerian PKI. The National Authority for Electronic Certification (Autorité Nationale de Certification Electronique – ANCE) is established by the Algerian government to operate the NR-CA. As the National PKI governance body, the ANCE's mandate is to operate the Policy Management Authority (PMA).

The Government Authority for Electronic Certification (Autorité Gouvernementale de Certification Electronique – AGCE) is established by the Algerian Government to operate the GOV-CA and to offer related trust services to the Algerian government domain. As such the AGCE operates as a Trust Services Provider (TSP) offering its services through a hierarchy of CAs, implemented under the National Root CA as follows:

- **Government CA**: Intermediate CA certified by the Root CA.

  The Government CA certifies two issuing CAs as follows:

  - o **Corporate CA**: Technically controlled CA that will issue certificates to natural persons (citizens and government employees) and legal persons (government entities);

  - o **Infrastructure CA**: Technically controlled CA that will issue certificates to non-natural entities, such as servers and VPN device certificates.

In addition to the above two issuing CAs, there are two options for TSPs to establish their own certification services under the Government CA:

- *Option 1:* The GOV-CA will certify an issuing CA operated by the TSP. This CA shall be technically constrained where the CA certificate (issued by the GOV-CA) will be populated with a combination of extended key usage and name constraint extensions to limit the scope within which the issuing CA from the TSP may issue end-user certificates;

- *Option 2:* This is the scenario of a TSP that have a bigger scope and requires flexibility to operate a more scalable hierarchy. In this scenario, the provisions of this CP/CPS allow the TSP to establish a two-level PKI hierarchy under the GOV-CA, first level being an intermediate (technically constrained) CA certified by the GOV-CA and second level being one or more issuing CAs certified by the TSP intermediate CA.

In both options, the AGCE is responsible for the supervision and authorization of the TSP that shall successfully complete an authorisation process.

The governance structure of the AGCE PKI is referred to as the AGCE PKI Governance Board (AGCE PKI GB). The PKI GB is composed of senior consultants appointed from PKI unit within AGCE, it is responsible for maintaining this and other CP and CPS documents relating to certificates within AGCE PKI. It interacts closely with the PMA to implement the GOV-CA operational cycle.

The Algerian Government tasked the Post and Electronic Communication Regulation Authority (Autorité de Régulation de la Poste et des Communications Électroniques - ARPCE) to oversee the establishment of non-government (private) TSPs under the Commercial PKI branch. In this context, the ARPCE operates as the Authority for Commercial Certification (Autorité Economique de Certification Electronique – AECE). The AECE implements and operates the COM-CA as an intermediate CA certified by the NR-CA. The overall mandate of the AECE is to license and supervise the operations of organizations offering certification and trust services to be certified by the COM-CA.

The abbreviations ARPCE and AECE will be used interchangeably hereafter.

Figure 1: The Algerian National PKI hierarchy

The issuance of a certificate by the Government or Commercial CA respectively, will endorse a TSP to become part of the Algeria National PKI governance model.

The present CP/CPS relates to the GOV-CA certification services. The GOV-CA only issues CA certificates to TSPs that are under the control of government entities.

1.2   Document Name and Identification

This document is titled "**Government CA CP/CPS**" and is referenced in related documents as [**AGCE GOV-CA CP/CPS**].

The GOV-CA will also use the **OID 2.16.12.3.2.1.1** to identify this document.

1.3   PKI Participants

Several parties make up the participants of this GOV-CA PKI. The parties mentioned hereunder including the GOV-CA, the GOV-CA RA, subscribers and relying parties are collectively called PKI participants.

1.3.1   Certification Authorities

The GOV-CA is a Certification Authority operated by AGCE from dedicated facilities located in Algeria. The GOV-CA issues certificates in accordance with this CP/CPS and ensures the availability of all services pertaining to the issued certificates, including the issuing, revocation and status verification services.

The AGCE operates with a governance and operating model relying on two complementary structures:

- PKI Governance Board: Operating as the governance function for the AGCE PKI. It groups the necessary functions for this purpose including the policy, compliance and design functions. The PKI Governance Board (hereinafter, PKI GB) provides strategic direction and continuously supervises the PKI operations team. The AGCE PKI GB operating cycle includes interactions with the PMA which is responsible for overseeing the operations of the GOV-CA and other trust services operated by the AGCE) through regular supervision audits conducted by the PMA audit and compliance function;

- PKI operations: This technical operations structure is responsible for operating the trust services implemented by AGCE, including the GOV-CA and issuing CAs certified by the GOV-CA. It falls under the management and supervision of the PKI GB.

The GOV-CA is certified by the Algeria National Root CA (NR-CA), under the supervision of the PMA. The PMA is responsible for the Algeria national PKI framework which includes the Root CP/CPS which the AGCE CP/CPS (this document) shall comply to. Pursuant to the broad and public purpose of digital certificates, the PMA seeks for inclusion and maintenance of the NR-CA into major operating system and software providers (namely into the corresponding "root programs" from Google, Apple, Microsoft, Adobe and Mozilla). This will result in the recognition of the NR-CA certificate in off-the-shelf applications and web browsers, supporting the technical and trust recognition of the electronic signatures and other trust services offered by the AGCE and other TSPs operating and approved under the Algerian PKI framework.

1.3.2   Registration Authorities

The AGCE operates the RA function of the GOV-CA. The RA function falls within the PKI operations structure and responsible for processing certificate management requests of the CAs (TSPs) under the GOV-CA. When a TSP requests for the creation of a CA certificate under the GOV-CA, it is the RA function responsibility to validate the request before communicating with the PKI GB in order to seek a formal approval of at least 2 members to proceed with the creation of the CA certificate. See section 3 and 4 for further details.

1.3.3 Subscribers

Subscribers are the subordinate CAs certified by the GOV-CA including CAs issuing certificates to end-entities or subordinate CAs issuing certificates to other CAs (collectively called "Subscribing CAs or Subordinate CAs".

 The AGCE issuing CAs (Corporate and Infrastructure CAs) are among the subscribing CAs governed by this CP/CPS. The subscribers:

- are identified in the Subject field of their certificate, issued by the GOV-CA;

- control the private key corresponding to the public key that is listed in their certificate.

1.3.4 Relying Parties

Relying parties are entities including natural or legal persons that rely on a certificate and/or a digital signature verifiable with reference to a public key listed in a subscriber's certificate.

The relying parties shall always verify the validity of a digital certificate issued by the GOV-CA using the GOV-CA Certificate Validity Status Service (e.g. CRL, webpage, OCSP), prior to relying on information featured in said certificate.

The GOV-CA certificate is published on the GOV-CA repository (see clause 2).

1.3.5 Other participants

There are no other participants for this CA.

1.4 Certificate Usage

Certain limitations apply to the usage of certificates issued by the GOV-CA that includes the ones stated hereunder.

1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses

The certificates issued by the GOV-CA can be used to

- Issue certificates for issuing CAs;

- Issue certificates for end-entities, in accordance with the certificate types accepted in the Algeria PKI domain;

- Issue certificate revocation lists (CRLs), containing the list of subscribers' revoked certificates;

- Issue OCSP certificates.

1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses

Certain limitations apply to the usage of certificates issued by the GOV-CA as stated in this CP/CPS:

- Subscribing CAs are not authorized to use their certificates to issue certificates or to support services that are out of the scope of what is described in their CP/CPS as approved by the AGCE;

- It is prohibited to use the GOV-CA certificate to sign end-user or server certificates (other than OCSP server).

1.5 Policy Administration

1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document

The AGCE PKI GB bears responsibility for the drafting, publishing, maintenance, and interpretation of this CP/CPS. This CP/CPS shall be approved by the PMA, since any policy approved by the PMA has to ultimately comply with the provisions of the NR-CA CP/CPS.

The AGCE PKI GBis comprised of members with relevant PKI policy experience and appointed to conduct the following PKI policy administration tasks:

- Drafting, amending, maintaining and interpreting this CP/CPS;
- Approve the publishing of this CP/CPS and its updates after the completion of a review process with the PMA to continuously ensure this CP/CPS complies with the NR-CA CP/CPS;
- Publishing this CP/CPS and its revisions;
- Conducting regular reviews on the GOV-CA operations.

1.5.2 Contact person

The AGCE can be contacted at the following address:

<div align="center">

Policy Authority
Autorité Gouvernementale de Certification Electronique.
Cyber Park Sidi Abdellah, Bt D,
Rahmania, Zeralda,
Alger.
Tel: + 213 (0) 23 202 327
Fax: + 213 (0) 23 202 327
Email: Certification.Info@agce.dz

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The AGCE accepts comments regarding the present CP/CPS only when they are addressed to the contact above.

Certificate Problem Report

Subscribers, relying parties, application software suppliers, and other third parties can report suspected key compromise, certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to any certificates issued under the GOV-CA by sending an email to Certification.Problem@agce.dz.

The AGCE will validate and investigate the request before taking an action in accordance to section 4.9.

1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

The AGCE PKI GB bears responsibility for the drafting, publishing, maintenance, and interpretation of this CP/CPS. This CP/CPS shall be approved by the PMA as well, since it has to ultimately comply with the provisions of the National Root CA CP.

1.5.4 CPS approval procedures

A dedicated process involves the AGCE PKI GB reviewing the initial version of this CP/CPS and any subsequent updates. Amendments shall either be in the form of a document containing an amended form of the CP/CPS or an update notice. The PKI GB as well as the PMA formally approves the new version of the document.

1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

1.6.1 Definitions

The following is a list of term definitions and acronyms used. The source is cited where relevant.

Applicant — The natural person or Legal Entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate issues, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber.

Applicant Representative — A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant: (i) who signs and submits, or approves a certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (ii) who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (iii) who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA. In the context of this CP/CPS, the applicant representative is in charge of submitting certificate requests and certificate revocation requests on behalf of the applicant.

Activation data — Secret information, other than cryptographic keys, that are required to operate cryptographic modules that need to be protected; e.g. a PIN, a password or pass-phrase, or a manually held key share

Audit Period — In a period-of-time audit, the period between the first day (start) and the last day of operations (end) covered by the auditors in their engagement. (This is not the same as the period of time when the auditors are on-site at the CA)

CA Key Pair — A Key Pair where the Public Key appears as the Subject Public Key Info in one or more Root CA Certificate(s) and/or Subordinate CA Certificate(s).

Certificate — An electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key and an identity

Certificate Policy (CP) — A set of rules that indicates the applicability of a named Certificate to a particular community and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.

Certificate Problem Report — Complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates.

Certificate Revocation List — A regularly updated time-stamped list of revoked Certificates that is created and digitally signed by the CA that issued the Certificates.

Certification Authority — An organization that is responsible for the creation, issuance, revocation, and management of Certificates. The term applies equally to both Gov-CA and Subordinate CAs.

Certification Practice Statement — One of several documents forming the governance framework in which Certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.

Certificate Profile — A set of documents or files that defines requirements for Certificate content and Certificate extensions in accordance with Section 7 of the Baseline Requirements. e.g. a Section in a CA's CPS or a certificate template file used by CA software.

Control — "Control" (and its correlative meanings, "controlled by" and "under common control with") means possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to: (1) direct the management, personnel, finances, or plans of such entity; (2) control the election of a majority of the directors ; or (3) vote that portion of voting shares required for "control" under the law of the entity's Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration but in no case less than 10%.

Country — Either a member of the United Nations OR a geographic region recognized as a Sovereign State by at least two UN member nations.

CSPRNG — A random number generator intended for use in cryptographic system.

Expiry Date — The "Not After" date in a Certificate that defines the end of a Certificate's validity period.

HSM — Hardware Security Module — a device designed to provide cryptographic functions specific to the safekeeping of private keys

IP Address — A 32-bit or 128-bit label assigned to a device that uses the Internet Protocol for communication.

Issuing CA — In relation to a particular Certificate, the CA that issued the Certificate. This could be either a Root CA or a Subordinate CA. In the context of this CP/CPS, the GOV-CA is an issuing CA.

Key Compromise — A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person or an unauthorized person has had access to it.

Key Generation Script — A documented plan of procedures for the generation of a CA Key Pair.

Key Pair — The Private Key and its associated Public Key.

Legal Entity — An association, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, trust, government entity or other entity with legal standing in a country's legal system.

Object Identifier — A unique alphanumeric or numeric identifier registered under the International Organization for Standardization's applicable standard for a specific object or object class.

OCSP Responder — An online server operated under the authority of the CA and connected to its Repository for processing Certificate status requests. See also, Online Certificate Status Protocol.

Online Certificate Status Protocol — An online Certificate-checking protocol that enables relying-party application software to determine the status of an identified Certificate. See also OCSP Responder.

Private Key — The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create Digital Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.

Public Key — The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify Digital Signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.

Public Key Infrastructure — A set of hardware, software, people, procedures, rules, policies, and obligations used to facilitate the trustworthy creation, issuance, management, and use of Certificates and keys based on Public Key Cryptography.

Publicly-Trusted Certificate — A Certificate that is trusted by virtue of the fact that its corresponding Root Certificate is distributed as a trust anchor in widely-available application software.

Qualified Auditor — A natural person or Legal Entity that meets the requirements of Section 8.2.

Registration Authority (RA) — Any Legal Entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of Certificates, but is not a CA, and hence does not sign or issue Certificates. An RA may assist in the certificate application process or revocation process or both. When "RA" is used as an adjective to describe a role or function, it does not necessarily imply a separate body, but can be part of the CA. The AGCE operates the RA for the GOV-CA.

Relying Party — Any natural person or Legal Entity that relies on a Valid Certificate. An Application Software Supplier is not considered a Relying Party when software distributed by such Supplier merely displays information relating to a Certificate.

Repository — An online database containing publicly-disclosed PKI governance documents (such as Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements) and Certificate status information, either in the form of a CRL or an OCSP response.

Root CA — The top level Certification Authority whose Root Certificate is distributed by Application Software Suppliers and that issues Subordinate CA Certificates.

Root Certificate — The self-signed Certificate issued by the Root CA to identify itself and to facilitate verification of Certificates issued to its Subordinate CAs.

Subject — The natural person, device, system, unit, or Legal Entity identified in a Certificate as the Subject. The Subject is either the Subscriber or a device under the control and operation of the Subscriber.

Subject Identity Information — Information that identifies the Certificate Subject. Subject Identity Information does not include a domain name listed in the subjectAltName extension or the Subject commonName field.

Subordinate CA — A Certification Authority whose Certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another Subordinate CA.

Subscriber — A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

Subscriber Agreement — An agreement between the CA and the Applicant/Subscriber that specifies the rights and responsibilities of the parties.

Terms of Use — Provisions regarding the safekeeping and acceptable uses of a Certificate issued in accordance with the Baseline Requirements when the Applicant/Subscriber is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

Valid Certificate — A Certificate that passes the validation procedure specified in RFC 5280.

Validity Period — The period of time measured from the date when the Certificate is issued until the Expiry Date.

1.6.2 Acronyms

AECE	Autorité Économique de Certification Électronique
AGCE	Autorité Gouvernementale de Certification Électronique
AICPA	American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
ANCE	Autorité Nationale de Certification Électronique
ARPCE	Autorité de Régulation de la Poste et des Communications Électroniques
CA	Certification Authority
CCTV	Closed Circuit TV
CICA	Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
COM-CA	Commercial CA
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DN	Distinguished Name
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
GOV-CA	Government Certification Authority
HSM	Hardware Security Module
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
ISO	International Standards Organization
NR-CA	National Root CA
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
PIN	Personal Information Number
PKCS#10	Certification Request Syntax Specification
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure

PKI GB	PKI Governance Board
PMA	Policy Management Authority
PSCE	Prestataire de Service de Confiance Électronique
RA	Registration Authority
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (The names of the inventors of the RSA algorithm)
RTO	Recovery Time Objective
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TC	Tiers de Confiance
TSA	Timestamping Authority
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TSP	Trust Service Provider (collective term for TCs and PSCEs)
UPS	Uninterruptible Power Supply
URI	Universal Resource Identifier, a URL, FTP address, email address, etc.
URL	Universal Resource Locator
VPN	Virtual Private Network

1.6.3 References

This document refers to the following:

- RFC3647 — Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework;

- RFC5280 — Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile;

- AICPA/CPA Canada Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities;

- CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly Trusted Certificates;

- CA/B Forum Network and Certificate System Security Requirements;

- Algerian Law 15-04 on "*signature électronique et certification*", fixant les règles générales relatives à la signature et à la certification électroniques ;

- Decree 135 (décret exécutif N°16-135 fr);

- Decree 134 (décret exécutif N°16-134 fr);

2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1 Repositories

The AGCE maintains an online repository of documents where it makes certain disclosures about the GOV-CA practices, procedures and the content of some of its policies. Published information include:

- This CP/CPS;
- TSP CP;
- PKI disclosure statement;
- Audit reports;
- Certificates issued by the GOV-CA.

The repository is publicly accessible at https://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository.

The AGCE reserves its right to make available any additional information as it sees fit.

2.2   Publication of Certification Information

As part of the online repository, the GOV-CA operations team maintains documents making certain disclosures about the GOV-CA practices, procedures and the content of some of its policies, including this CP/CPS. The AGCE will at all times make available the current versions of the GOV-CA CP/CPS document on its public repository.

The online repository is available 24 × 7 and accessible at https://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository.

The AGCE reserves its right to make available and publish information on the NR-CA practices, as it sees fit.

The GOV-CA conforms to the current version of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly Trusted Certificates published at https://www.cabforum.org. In the event of any inconsistency between this document and those requirements, the requirements take precedence over this document.

With regard to the GOV-CA activities, and due to their sensitivity, the GOV-CA operations team refrains from making publicly available certain subcomponents and elements of certain documents. However, such documents and documented practices are conditionally available to designated authorised parties in the context of audit(s).

The GOV-CA publishes digital certificate status information in intervals indicated in this CP/CPS. The provision of GOV-CA issued electronic certificate validity status information is a 24x7x365 service.

- The GOV-CA publishes CRLs including any changes since the publication of the previous CRL, at regular intervals.
- The GOV-CA maintains an OCSP responder compliant with RFC 6960. OCSP information is available immediately to relying party applications. The actual OCSP URL to be queried by relying party organizations is referenced in the certificates issued by the GOV-CA.

The GOV-CA operations team maintains the Certificate Dissemination webpage, the CRL distribution point and the information therein, the OCSP responder and the information therein, as long as there are non-expired certificates containing the CRL distribution point.

2.3   Time or Frequency of Publication

The GOV-CA and OCSP certificates are published to the GOV-CA public repository once they are issued.

A CRL is issued by the GOV-CA every six months. In addition, a new CRL will be generated and published following the revocation or issuance of any certificate.

The GOV-CA operations team ensures that the CP/CPS of GOV-CA is reviewed at least once annually and makes appropriate changes so that the GOV-CA operations remain fully aligned to the CA/B forum Baseline Requirements and other requirements as listed in the "References" section of this CP/CPS.

Modified versions of the CP/CPS are published within seven days maximum after the PKI GB approval.

2.4   Access controls on repositories

Public read-only access is given to the GOV-CA repository. Security controls are implemented on the repository by the GOV-CA operations team to prevent any unauthorized addition, or modification of the data published on the public repository.

3 Identification and Authentication

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Type of names

The GOV-CA follows certain naming and identification rules that include types of names assigned to the subject, such as X.500 distinguished names.

Names have to be meaningful and unique.

The **Government CA** DN is as follows:

- **CountryName** : DZ
- **OrganizationName** : AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE
- **CommonName** : Government CA

The **Government CA OCSP** certificates bear the following DN:

- **CountryName** : DZ
- **stateOrProvinceName** : Algiers
- **OrganizationName** : AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE
- **CommonName** : Government CA OCSP

The **Corporate CA** DN is as follows:

- **CountryName** : DZ
- **OrganizationName** : AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE
- **CommonName**: Corporate CA

The **Infrastructure CA** DN is as follows:

- **CountryName** : DZ
- **OrganizationName** : AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE
- **CommonName** : Infrastructure CA

Government TSP CAs have a DN structured as follows:

- **CountryName** : DZ
- **OrganizationName**: Name of the TSP organisation
- **CommonName** :Meaningful name of the TSP CA

3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

Names are meaningful since the CN (Common Name) contains the name of the subscriber.

Subscribers cannot be anonymous or pseudonymous.

3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

This CP/CPSdoes not permit anonymous or pseudonymous subscribers.

3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

Distinguished Names in subscriber certificates are encoded according to X.500 standards and ASN.1 syntax and can be interpreted as such.

3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

AGCE enforces the controls necessary to guarantee that subject DN are unique. Refer to section 3.1.1.

3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication and Role of Trademarks

Certificates may be requested from the GOV-CA only from the subscribing CAs and as per the naming conventions stated in this CP/CPS. Refer to section 3.1.1.

3.2 Initial Identity Validation

3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

AGCE enforces validation of the proof of possession of the private key as part of the certificate request processing. The proof of possession is submitted CSRs in PKCS#10 format.

3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The GOV-CA PKI GB/RA approves the establishment of the AGCE issuing CAs through a formal internal process involving the top management of AGCE and the PKI GB director.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

The identification of the subject in the certificates issued by the GOV-CA is validated against the exact meaningful denomination, as agreed with the official representatives of the TSP.

The certificates are requested from the GOV-CA RA by duly delegated representatives of the TSP. A registration procedure is enforced by the GOV-CA RA to duly perform identity verifications of the authorized representatives. This process encompasses:

- Signature of a registration / certificate request form by the TSP representative;
- GOV-CA RA using the Algerian Official Journal (Journal Officiel) to validate relevant information related to the TSP, including the official representative;
- Any additional paperwork to be provided by the TSP representative and deemed necessary by the GOV-CA RA, as part of the verification process;
- review and validation by the PKI GB of the requesting entity CPS;
- validation of the existence of the requesting entity using the Algerian Official journal;
- site visit by a GOV-CA RA representative to the requesting entity site in order to validate the address;
- In-person verification of the identity of the requesters nominated by the TSP representative.

3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity

The GOV-CA does not issue certificates for individuals.

3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber Information

All subscriber information contained within certificate issued by the GOV-CA shall be verified by AGCE RA.

3.2.5 Validation of Authority

Refer to section 3.2.2.

3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

No trust relationships (i.e. cross-certification) exist in the Algeria National PKI between the Algeria National Root and other PKI domains.

3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key

Identification and authentication for re-keying is performed as in initial registration.

3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after revocation

Identification and authentication procedures for re-key after revocation is same as during initial certification. This is executed only as part of a re-key operation that is approved after all investigations are performed by the PKI GB.

3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

For AGCE issuing CAs certificate revocation, the identification and authentication procedures of revocation requests go through an internal AGCE process involving the PKI operations team and the AGCE PKI GB. An investigation report is delivered for the approval of the PKI GB. If the certificate revocation is due to a key compromise, the AGCE Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity plan will be executed.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

For TSP subscribing CAs certificate revocation, the identification and authentication procedures of revocation requests involves a formal request from duly authorized representative of the TSP. A revocation procedure is enforced by the AGCE GOV-CA RA. It encompasses:

- The signature of a revocation request form by the authorized representative;
- The verification of the identity of the requesters against the information available to the GOV-CA RA (provided during the TSP enrolment);
- Communication with the TSP to provide reasonable assurances that the TSP official representative authorized the revocation operation. Such communication, depending on the circumstances, may include one or more of the following: telephone, e-mail or courier service.

4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

The GOV-CA issues certificates to AGCE issuing CAs and TSPs that are within the Government domain.

The TSP for which a certificate has been issued by the GOV-CA has an obligation to inform the GOV-CA RA of all changes in the information featured in a certificate during the operational period of its certificate, or of any other fact that materially affects the validity of a certificate, such as changes to the TSP certification practices.

For AGCE issuing CAs, the GOV-CA RA authorizes the issuance or the revocation of certificates as part of operational key ceremonies, and after the AGCE PKI GB authorizes the respective operation.

For a government TSP subscribing CAs, the GOV-CA RA authorizes the issuance or the revocation of certificates at the request of a TSP duly authorized representative. In case of a proven TSP key compromise, the GOV-CA shall immediately revoke the concerned TSP certificate.

4.1 Certificate Application

4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are established as part of internal AGCE processes. The GOV-CA RA coordinates with the PKI operations team and engages the AGCE PKI GB for approving the certificate applications for the AGCE issuing CAs.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

The TSP dully authorized representative submits the certificate application as part of the overall process through which the TSP is authorized by the AGCE PKI GB to setup its subscribing CA under the GOV-CA.

4.1.2   Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE PKI GB authorizes the setup of the AGCE issuing CA. The GOV-CA RA performs all necessary internal verification involving the AGCE PKI operations team. These verifications include the following steps:

- The conclusion of internal ceremony dry runs and a resulting report from the PKI GB audit function;
- The readiness of necessary key ceremony documents related to certifying AGCE issuing CA;
- The confirmation from AGCE PKI operations manager on the readiness of the operations team to operate the AGCE issuing CAs post the go live ceremonies;
- Approval letter from the PKI GB for executing the necessary key ceremonies.

The certificate application processing for the AGCE issuing can then be processed and the related key ceremonies planned and executed according to AGCE GOV-CA key ceremony procedures.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

The GOV-CA RA executes the necessary vetting checklist for TSPs and their applicant representatives. For any certificate application to the GOV-CA, the identity of the applicant representative is verified by the GOV-CA RA that verifies that all data provided in the certificate application are accurate.

The applicant representative will issue to the GOV-CA RA its request for certificate issuance in a form of certificate application that includes a signed subscriber agreement. The GOV-CA RA performs the necessary verification steps including:

- The identification of the Government Entity;
- Involve the PKI GB for reviewing the TSP CPS and ensuring the CPS complies with the relevant provisions of this CP/CPS and with the TSP CP;
- Description of the TSP purpose from the application;
- Required certificate profiles and the values of each attribute that should be present in the CA certificate;
- If deemed necessary, conduct a dry run of key ceremony with the TSP involving the respective test environments and test data;
- Verify the authority of the applicant representative through an attestation letter;
- Communication with the TSP to confirm all approvals are in place from the TSP top management. Such communication, depending on the circumstances, may include one, or more of the following: telephone, site visit, e-mail or registered mail delivery;
- Confirm with the AGCE PKI GB that other pre-requisites related to establishing the TSP are processed by the PKI GB before the GOV-CA RA can accept the certificate request.

The GOV-CA RA securely stores the certificate application along with all supporting documentation for future reference.

4.2   Certificate Application Processing

4.2.1   Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are established as part of internal AGCE processes. The AGCE PKI GB authorizes the setup of the AGCE issuing CA. The GOV-CA RA performs all necessary internal verification involving the AGCE PKI operations team. Refer to clause 4.1 for further details on the verification steps.

After all verification steps are performed successfully, the certificate application processing for the AGCE issuing can then be processed, and the related key ceremonies planned and executed according to AGCE GOV-CA key ceremony procedures.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

Certificate applications for the GOV-CA are received as part of an operational cycle agreed between the GOV-CA RA and the applicant representative. The certificate application processing involves the identity verification of applicant representative through an in-person meeting. Other steps are executed by the GOV-CA RA including the verification of the information provided in the certificate request form against the approved CPS versions.

The GOV-CA RA ensures that certificate applications are only processed if the following conditions are met:

- The existence of the applicant is verified using the Algerian Official Journal (Journal Officiel) which is expected to contain detailed information about the entity including its legal name and authorized official representative. The address of the government entity is also verified through an in-person visit from the GOV-CA RA to the relevant address;

- the applicant representative's identity is verified through an in-person meeting with the GOV-CA RA that verifies the authority of the applicant representative through an attestation letter received;

- the certificate request is properly formatted;

- the certificate request contains the expected complete subscriber data including the official organization names;

- a formal, signed approval is received from the applicant representation though a signed subscriber agreement;

- the CPS of the applicant is reviewed by the GOV-CA RA;

- the cycle of mandated audit by the GOV-CA RA successfully executed by the applicant.

The above verification steps are always executed by the GOV-CA RA for each certification management operation with the subscribing entities.

4.2.2   Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are established as part of internal AGCE processes. The AGCE PKI GB authorizes the setup of the AGCE issuing CA after validating that all pre-requisites are met including the fulfilment of all compliance verifications.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

Once the verification and certification evaluation processes are complete complete (as per the steps described in section 4.2.1) with an authorization granted by the PKI GB to process the certificate application, the AGCE GOV-CA RA shall agree with the applicant representative on a date for executing the TSP certification key ceremony.

In case the certificate application is rejected, the AGCE GOV-CA RA informs the TSP through a formal response referring to the audit report findings.

4.2.3   Time to Process Certificate Applications

No stipulation — this section intentionally left blank.

4.3 Certificate Issuance

4.3.1 CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

Certificate issuance operations for AGCE issuing CA are executed in accordance with the AGCE operational key ceremonies.

The GOV-CA RA gathers all required parties at the AGCE GOV-CA primary facility to execute the certificate generation for the AGCE issuing CA. The pre-conditions for executing the ceremony are documented in clause 4.1 and 4.2. As part of the ceremony, the GOV-CA RA performs final verification before issuing the certificate. At a minimum, the following verification steps are performed:

- Identity verification of all attendees;
- Validation of the format of the certificate request (shall be in PKCS#10 format);
- Verification that the certificate request contains valid subscriber data (as per the provisions of this CP/CPS).

During the ceremony, PKI administrators in trusted roles direct commands for the GOV-CA to perform a certificate signing operation.

Following the successful completion of the ceremony and the issuance of the AGCE issuing CA certificate, the GOV-CA RA inspects the file contents and performs a verification against the expected certificate format. The certificate is then handed over to the AGCE PKI operations team for further processing and import into the target AGCE issuing CA systems. All parties that participated in the ceremony sign a ceremony report.

Further details on the certificate issuing process are documented in the related AGCE key ceremony documentation.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

The certificate issuance for the government TSP CA is executed in accordance with the AGCE operational key ceremonies.

The GOV-CA RA gathers all required parties at the AGCE GOV-CA primary facility to execute the TSP certificate generation. The pre-conditions for executing the ceremony are documented in clause 4.1 and 4.2. As part of the ceremony, the GOV-CA RA performs final verification before processing the TSP certificate application. At a minimum, the following verification steps are performed:

- Identity verification of all attendees;
- Validation of the format of the certificate request;
- Verification that the certificate request contains valid subscriber data (as agreed; during the certificate application processing).

During the ceremony, PKI administrators in trusted roles direct commands for the GOV-CA to perform a certificate signing operation.

Following the successful completion of the ceremony and the issuance of the TSP certificate, issued certificate contents are validated against the agreed TSP CA certificate format. The certificate is then handed over to the TSP representative. All parties that participated in the ceremony sign a ceremony report, including the TSP representative.

Further details on the certificate issuing process are documented in the related AGCE key ceremony documentation.

4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

Once the certificate is issued, the GOV-CA RA ensures that the certificate issued by the GOV-CA contains all data that was presented to it in the request.

Following issuance of a certificate, the GOV-CA RA then handovers the issued certificate to the subscriber.

4.4 Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

Following the successful completion of the ceremony and the issuance of the AGCE CA issuing CA certificate, the GOV-CA RA edits the file contents and performs a verification against the expected certificate format. The certificate is then handed over to the AGCE PKI operations team for further processing and import into the target AGCE issuing CA systems.

The certificate is considered as formally accepted if successfully imported to the target AGCE issuing CA systems. The certificate is then published on the target AGCE CA repository.

In case issues are raised in relation to certificate contents, or to the acceptance of the certificate by the target systems, the AGCE GOV-CA RA will plan and execute another ceremony in coordination with all relevant parties. These exception scenarios are documented in the AGCE key ceremony documentation.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

Following the successful completion of the ceremony and the issuance of the TSP certificate, the GOV-CA RA edits the file contents in front of the TSP representative. The issued certificate contents are validated against the agreed TSP CA certificate format. The certificate is then handed over to the TSP representative.

The TSP PKI operations team will import the certificate by executing their own operational ceremony. If the CA certificate is successfully imported into the target TSP subscribing CA systems, the TSP PKI operations team publish the certificate on the TSP repository. The AGCE GOV-CA RA is notified on the successful import of the TSP CA certificate into the TSP target systems. This constitutes the formal acceptance by the TSP of the certificate issued by the GOV-CA.

In case the certificate could not be processed successfully by the TSP target systems, the reasons for non-acceptance will be discussed with the AGCE GOV-CA RA and an investigation shall follow. If no measures can be agreed upon in order to obtain the certificate acceptance by the TSP target systems, the certificate shall be revoked by the GOV-CA.

If it is possible to restart the ceremony in a way that the reason for non-acceptance is avoided, the ceremony will be repeated according to documented key exception ceremonies.

4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

Following the acceptance of a certificate, AGCE posts an issued certificate on the Certificate Repository.

4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No other entities or organizations are notified directly of the certificate issuance. They are indirectly notified through the update of the Repository.

4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

The responsibilities relating to the use of keys and certificates are listed below.

4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage

Unless otherwise stated in this CP/CPS, the subscriber's responsibilities include:

- Providing correct and up-to-date information to the GOV-CA as part of its application;
- Not tampering with a certificate;
- Only using certificates for legal and authorized purposes in accordance with the common general requirements applicable to this CP/CPS, and with its own CP/CPS;
- Protecting the CA private keys (and related secrets) from compromise, loss, disclosure, or otherwise unauthorized use of their private keys;
- Notifying the GOV-CA RA immediately if any details in the certificate become invalid, or as a result of any compromise, loss, disclosure, or otherwise unauthorized use of their private keys;
- Not using the certificate outside its validity period, or after it has been revoked.

Refer to section 9.6.3 of this CP/CPS for complementary details.

4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage

A party relying on a certificate issued by the GOV-CA shall:

- Use proper cryptographic tools to validate the certificate signature and validity period;
- Validate the certificate by using the CRL, or the OCSP validity status information service in accordance with the certificate path validation procedure;
- Trust the certificate only if it has not been revoked and is within the validity period;
- Trust the certificate only for the signing of certificates and CRLs.

4.6 Certificate Renewal

Certificate Renewal is the act of issuing a new certificate with a new validity period while the identifying information and the public key from the old certificate are duplicated in the new certificate.

Certificate renewal is not supported by the GOV-CA. Only certificate re-key is supported.

4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal

Not applicable.

4.6.2 Who may request renewal

Not applicable.

4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests

Not applicable.

4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

Not applicable.

4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

Not applicable.

4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

Not applicable.

4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

Not applicable.

4.7 Certificate Re-key

4.7.1 Circumstance for Certificate Re-key

Certificate Re-key is the act of re-issuing a certificate for an existing subscriber with a new validity period, new serial number and different public key, while the remaining information from the old certificate is duplicated in the new certificate.

Certificate re-key is supported by GOV-CA according to a key-change over cycle agreed with the subscribing CAs. The re-key process (including identity validation, certificate issuance and communication to relevant parties) is similar to the initial certificate application.

4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.7.6 Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.8 Certificate Modification

4.8.1 Circumstance for Certificate modification

The GOV-CA does not allow certificate modification. In case the Subscriber wants to change the certified information, or has requested the revocation of their certificate due to circumstances mentioned in the previous paragraph, and wishes to be issued a new certificate, the Subscriber shall submit a full certificate application, as for initial enrolment.

4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate modification

Refer to section 4.8.1.

4.8.3 Processing Certificate modification Requests

Refer to section 4.8.1.

4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Refer to section 4.8.1.

4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a modified Certificate

Refer to section 4.8.1.

4.8.6 Publication of the modified Certificate by the CA

Refer to section 4.8.1.

4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Refer to section 4.8.1.

4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

Suspension of a CA certificate is not allowed by the PMA. Only permanent certificate revocation is allowed.

4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The following events may justify the AGCE issuing CA certificate revocation:

- The PKI GB is made aware that the CA operations (including certificate usage) has not complied with the provisions of this CP/CPS, the issuing CA CPS and TSP CP, and applicable CP or CPS, and WebTrust requirements;
- The regular risk assessment conducted by the AGCE PKI GB shows that the CA certificate contents (e.g. key length, cryptographic algorithm, …etc.) presents an unacceptable risk to the overall AGCE PKI domain;
- AGCE did not successfully complete the regular surveillance audit organized by the PMA, and the documented evidence shows that the AGCE misused its issuing CA certificate, or didn't operate continuously in accordance with the provisions of this CP/CPS and the NR-CA CP/CPS, leading the PMA to conclude that the identified issues cause an unacceptable risk to the WebTrust status of the Algeria national PKI;
- The PMA suspects or determines that revocation of an AGCE issuing CA Certificate is indicated.

Considering the criticality of the operation and its impact on the AGCE PKI domain, the AGCE PKI GB invites the PMA to an exceptional meeting.

This meeting is organized no later than twenty-four (24) hours after the circumstances of certificate revocation were identified. The outcome of this meeting is the establishment of the circumstances triggering the AGCE issuing CA certificate revocation request and the related certificate revocation reason(s). The AGCE PKI GB may request additional information/evidence which shall be provided within a maximum of seventy-two (72) hours. At the end of this process, the AGCE issuing CA certificate revocation is approved by the PKI GB and endorsed by the PMA. This decision is documented in a report signed by the PKI GB and the other parties that participated in the decision making.

The certificate revocation ceremony is planned and executed no later than seventy-two (72) hours after the CA certificate revocation is authorized by the AGCE PKI GB. The revocation ceremony is witnessed by members of the PMA. The outcome of the ceremony shall be as follows:

- The AGCE issuing CA certificate is revoked (with the right revocation reason) on the AGCE GOV-CA PKI system;
- A CRL is generated by the AGCE GOV-CA, placed on the target public repository and made immediately available for relying parties;
- The AGCE PKI GB publishes a notice on its repository containing the details of the certificate being revoked and the revocation circumstances;

- The AGCE PKI GB communicates with the PMA so that the AGCE issuing CA service reference is removed by the PMA from the Algeria National Trust List;
- The AGCE GOV-CA RA ensures that all communication, reports and evidence in relation to the certificate revocation operation is recorded and archived for future use as part of audit processes.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

The revocation request may be triggered by the PKI GB or by the TSP. The GOV-CA RA shall ensure a Subordinate CA Certificate is revoked within a maximum of seven (7) days if one or more of the following events:

- The TSP requests revocation in writing;

- The TSP notifies the GOV-CA TA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;

- The PKI GB obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6;

- The PKI GB obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;

- The PKI GB is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with this document or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement;

- The PKI GB determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;

- CA termination plan was triggered by the PKI GB or TSP so that GOV-CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements as per the CA termination plan;

- The GOV-CA or Subordinate CA right to issue Certificates under the provisions of the CP/CPS expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;

- Revocation is required by the GOV-CA CP/CPS.

Whenever any of the above circumstances occur, the following process is executed by the AGCE GOV-CA RA:

- When the revocation request is triggered by the TSP, the AGCE GOV-CA RA performs the following steps:
  - the review and verification of the revocation request form received from the TSP authorized representative, this includes the verification of the identity of the requesters against the information available to the GOV-CA RA (provided during the TSP enrolment);
  - communication with the TSP to provide reasonable assurances that the TSP official representative authorized the revocation operation and is aware of the circumstances that triggered the revocation request. Such communication, depending on the circumstances, may include one or more of the following: telephone, e-mail or registered mail delivery;
  - the organization of a face-to-face meeting involving relevant members from the TSP and the AGCE PKI GB.
- When the AGCE PKI GB triggers the TSP CA revocation after finding evidence of compromise, or suspected compromise of the TSP CA private key, the AGCE GOV-CA RA communicate with the TSP and shall ensure a Subordinate CA Certificate is revoked within a maximum of seven (7) days.

4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

The permanent revocation of a Certificate can be requested by:

- The Subscriber himself;
- AGCE at its own discretion (if for instance a compromise is known for this CA key).

Certificate revocation requests from subscribers are only accepted if the subscriber is authorized and authenticated to request revocation for the specific certificate as described in section 4.9.1.

4.9.3   Procedure for Revocation Request

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

Refer to section 4.9.1.

Subscribing CA – Government TSP

The PKI GB provides a continuous ability for subscribers to submit certificate revocation requests. Considering the criticality of the operation, the following procedure takes place:

- A meeting is organized by the PKI GB no later than twenty-four (24) hours after receiving the request from the subscriber.

- The subscriber discusses the circumstances of certificate revocation. The outcome of this meeting is the establishment of the circumstances triggering the CA certificate revocation request and the related certificate revocation reason. The PKI GB and the subscriber may request additional information/evidence from the technical teams which shall be provided within a maximum of seventy-two (48 hours).

- As soon as the revocation request relevance is confirmed through a formal communication between the PKI GB and the subscriber, the subscriber submits a formal revocation request to the GOV-CA RA. This is approved by the PKI GB.

- The certificate revocation ceremony is planned and executed not later than seventy-two (72 hours) after the CA certificate revocation is authorized by the PKI GB. The revocation ceremony is witnessed by members in trusted role from the PKI GB and the the subscriber. The outcome of the ceremony will be as follows:

    o The subscriber CA certificate is revoked with the right revocation reason on the GOV-CA system;

    o A CRL is generated by the GOV-CA and placed on the target public location within 24 hours maximum from the revocation;

    o The GOV-CA and the subscribe shall publish a notice within 24 hours maximum from the revocation operation containing the details of the certificate being revoked and the revocation circumstances.

Certificate problems reporting:

Subscribers, relying parties, application software suppliers, and other third parties may submit certificate problem reports via Certification.Problem@agce.dz.

The GOV-CA discloses instructions related to certificate revocation and certificate problem reporting on its public repository. For any certificate problem report, the notifier is requested to include his contact details, suspected abuse and related domain name. The GOV-CA RA begins the investigation of a certificate problem report within 24 hours of receipt and decide whether revocation or other appropriate actions are required.

4.9.4   Revocation Request Grace Period

There is no revocation grace period. Revocation requests are processed by the PKI GB timely after a decision for revocation is made and in all circumstances within the timeframes listed under section 4.9.1 of this CP/CPS.

4.9.5   Time within which CA must process the revocation request

For certificate problem reports, the PKI GB begins investigations within 24 hours from receipt. The PKI GB initiates communication with the affected subscriber and where appropriate, with Algerian law enforcement authorities. A preliminary communication on the certificate problem is sent to the third party that filed the certificate problem report and to the subscriber. Refer to section 4.9.1 for further details on the investigations and processing of the certificate problem executed by the PKI GB.

4.9.6   Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

Revocation information is offered to relying parties through CRLs published on a publicly available web server or through its OCSP responder. Relying parties shall use any of these methods while processing a certificate issued by the GOV-CA.

4.9.7   CRL Issuance Frequency

The GOV-CA update and reissue CRLs (i) once every six months and (ii) within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate. The value of the nextUpdate field of CRL issued by the GOV-CA is set to 184 days beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

4.9.8   Maximum Latency for CRLs

Not stipulation.

4.9.9   Online Revocation/Status Checking Availability

The GOV-CA offers an OCSP responder that conforms to RFC 6960 and whose certificate is signed by the GOV-CA. The OCSP certificate contains an extension of type id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck, as defined by RFC 6960.

The actual OCSP URL to be queried by relying party organizations is referenced in the certificates issued by the GOV-CA.

4.9.10   Online Revocation Checking Requirements

A relying party must confirm the validity of a Certificate in accordance with section 4.9.6 prior to relying on the Certificate.

The GOV-CA OCSP responder supports the HTTP GET method.

The GOV-CA updates information provided via its OCSP responder (i) every six months; and (ii) within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate.

The GOV-CA OCSP responder that receive a request for status of a certificate that has not been issued, shall not respond with a "good" status for such Certificates. OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically Constrained, in line with Section 7.1.5, will not respond with a "good" status for such Certificates.

The GOV-CA operations team monitors the OCSP responder for requests for "unused" serial numbers as part of its security monitoring procedures and any such case will trigger further investigation.

4.9.11   Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

The GOV-CA only uses OCSP and CRL as methods for publishing certificate revocation information.

4.9.12   Special Requirements related to Key Compromise

If the PKI GB discovers, or has a reason to believe, that there has been a compromise of the GOV-CA private key, this will be considered as a disaster scenario and the GOV-CA Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity plan is invoked.

Refer to section 4.9.1 for circumstances of subscribing CA certificate revocation.

4.9.13   Circumstances for Suspension

Certificate suspension is not supported by the GOV-CA.

4.9.14   Who Can Request Suspension

Not applicable.

4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

Not applicable.

4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period

Not applicable.

4.10 Certificate Status Services

4.10.1 Operational Characteristics

CRLs shall be published by the GOV-CA on a public repository which is available to relying parties through HTTP protocol queries.

The GOV-CA OCSP responder exposes an HTTP interface accessible to relying parties.

Revocation entries on a CRL or OCSP responses are not removed until after the expiry date of the revoked certificates.

4.10.2 Service Availability

The repository including the latest CRL shall be available 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, with an availability percentage of minimum 99 % over one year.

The GOV-CA operations team operates and maintains the CRL and OCSP capabilities with resources sufficient to provide a response time of ten seconds or less under normal operating conditions.

The PKI GB maintains a 24X7 ability to respond internally to high-priority certificate problem report as described in section 4.9.3 of this CP/CPS.

4.10.3 Optional Features

No stipulation.

4.11 End of Subscription

The end of subscription for a TSP is triggered by the termination of the TSP certification services and the TSP undergoing a termination plan with AGCE. Refer to section 4.9.1 for further details.

4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

CA Private Keys are not escrowed. The GOV-CA does not support key escrow services.

4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

Not applicable. The GOV-CA does not provide session key encapsulation and recovery services.

5 Facility, Management, Operational and Physical Controls

This clause describes non-technical security controls used by the GOV-CA operations team to perform the functions of key generation, certificate issuance, certificate revocation, audit, and archival.

The GOV-CA security management program complies with the CA/Browser Forum's Network and Certificate System Security Requirements. This program includes:

1. Physical security and environmental controls;
2. System integrity controls, including configuration and change management, patch management, vulnerability management and malware/virus detection/prevention;

3. Maintaining an inventory of all assets (PKI and non-PKI) and manage the assets according to their classification;
4. Network security and firewall management, including port restrictions and IP address filtering;
5. User management, separate trusted-role assignments, education, awareness, and training; and
6. Logical access controls, activity logging and monitoring, and regular user access review to provide individual accountability.

The PKI GB conducts an annual Risk Assessment on the GOV-CA that:

1. Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes;
2. Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes; and
3. Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements in place to counter such threats.

Based on the Risk Assessment, the GOV-CA operations team develops, implements, and maintains its security management plan consisting of security procedures, measures, and products designed to achieve the objectives set forth above. The security plan includes administrative, organizational, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes.

5.1 Physical Controls

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA PKI GB ensures that appropriate physical controls are implemented on the GOV-CA (hosting) premises for their activities. These physical controls are documented in internal documentation: "Logical/physical access control policies" and "Physical site requirements". These controls are enforced and verified regularly as follows:

- Regular internal audits performed by the AGCE PKI GB audit function on the AGCE PKI operations;
- Regular formal surveillance audits performed by the PMA on the AGCE PKI operations and coordinated with the AGCE PKI GB audit function.

The AGCE GOV-CA premise physical controls include the following:

5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

All critical components of the PKI solution are housed within a highly secure facility operated by the AGCE. The whole facility foundations and basement ceiling are built with concrete and reinforced with steel rebar. Physical security controls are enforced so that access of unauthorized persons is prevented through five layers of physical security. When this layered access control is combined with the physical security protection mechanisms such as guards, intrusion sensors and CCTV, it provides robust protection against unauthorized access to the AGCE GOV-CA systems.

5.1.2 Physical Access

The AGCE GOV-CA systems are protected by multi-tiered physical security measures, with access to the lower tiers only possible by first gaining access through the higher tiers. The inner controlled areas are accessible only via three gated security checkpoints. Technical physical security controls are continuously enforced, including two-factor authentication to move from one layer to another, protection sensors, CCTV and video recordings. Procedural controls are also enforced including the continuous escort of pre-authorized visitors to the site. All these controls protect the facility from unauthorized access and are monitored on a 24x7x365 basis.

5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

The design of the facility hosting the AGCE GOV-CA provides UPS and backup generators with enough capability to support the GOV-CA operations in power failure circumstances. UPS units and stand-by generators

are available for the entire facility. A fully redundant air-conditioning system is installed in the areas hosting the GOV-CA systems. All these systems ensure that the GOV-CA equipment continuously operate within the manufacturers' range of operating temperatures and humidity.

5.1.4   Water Exposures

The AGCE PKI GB has taken reasonable precautions to protect the GOV-CA facility and GOV-CA systems, and minimize the impact of water exposure. These include installing the GOV-CA equipment on elevated floors with moisture detectors.

5.1.5   Fire Prevention and Protection

The AGCE PKI GB follows leading practices and applicable safety regulations in Algeria to ensure the GOV-CA facility is monitored 24x7x365 and equipped with fire and heat detection equipment. Fire suppression equipment is installed within dedicated areas and automatically activates in the case of fire, and can be manually activated, if necessary. Additional fire prevention and protection enforced in the GOV-CA facility include:

- Fire-resistant walls and pillars;
- Fire and smoke detectors deployed in the facility and which are monitored by the facility alarm systems;
- A sufficient number of fire extinguishers deployed in the facility.

5.1.6   Media Storage

Electronic, optical, and other storage media are subject to the multi-layered physical security and are protected from accidental damage (water, fire, electromagnetic interference). Audit and backup storage media are stored in a secure fire-proof safe and duplicated and stored in the GOV-CA disaster recovery location.

5.1.7   Waste Disposal

All waste paper and storage media created within the secure facility shall be destroyed before discarding. Paper media shall be shredded using a cross-hatch shredder, and magnetic media shall be wiped by de-magnetization, or physically destroyed. HSMs and related key management devices shall be physically destroyed, or securely erased prior to disposal.

5.1.8   Offsite Backup

Full and incremental backups of the GOV-CA online systems are taken regularly to provide enough recovery information when the recovery of the GOV-CA systems is necessary. At least one full backup and several incremental backups are taken daily in accordance with documented backup policies and procedures enforced by the GOV-CA operations team. Adequate back-up facilities ensure that backup copies are transferred to the disaster recovery location where they are stored with the same physical, technical and procedurals controls that apply to the primary facility.

The backup and recovery system is tested at least once a year in accordance with the GOV-CA Disaster Recovery Plan.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The physical and environmental controls listed in the previous clauses related to the GOV-CA, shall apply to the AGCE issuing CAs.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall implement physical and environment controls for the facility hosting their CAs such that these controls at minimum, are in line with the GOV-CA physical and environmental security controls listed above.

5.2 Procedural Controls

GOV-CA

The AGCEPKI GB ensures that the appropriate procedural controls are implemented for GOV-CA activities to provide reasonable assurance of the trustworthiness and competence of the staff, and of the satisfactory performance of their duties in the field of PKI governance and operations. The procedural controls include the following:

5.2.1 Trusted Roles

All members or staff with functional roles in the key management operations, including but not limited to, administrators, security officers, and system auditors, or any other role that materially affects such operations, are considered as serving in a trusted position; i.e. trusted operatives.

The AGCEPKI GB is responsible for due diligence in vetting of all candidates to serve in trusted roles, to determine their trustworthiness and competence, prior to the candidate's employment in their respective role.

At minimum, the following trusted roles are established with the appropriate segregation of duties:

- PKI system administration: Trusted roles authorized to install and configure the GOV- CA, and to perform back-up, recovery and maintenance operations. Also authorized to add other users in the target GOV-CA systems;
- PKI system operation: Trusted roles authorized to execute the GOV-CA operational cycle and is involved in critical operations such as subscribers' certification operations and GOV-CA CRLs generation;
- Key management operation: Trusted roles cleared to operate as key custodians and hold key material and secrets necessary for the execution of GOV-CA operational ceremonies;
- Security officers:
  - o HSM administrator: Authorized to hold HSM activation data and secrets necessary for the HSM operation;
  - o Security operations: Staff authorized to collect and view the audit logs generated by the GOV-CA systems as part of the continuous monitoring of the GOV-CA systems.
- PKI audit: Trusted role authorized to review the GOV-CA systems audit logs as part of regular internal compliance audits.

5.2.2 Number of Persons Required Per Task

The AGCE PKI GB is responsible to ensure that the GOV-CA operations team enforces segregation of duties for critical GOV-CA functions to prevent operators from holding too many privileges,thereby becoming potential malicious agents. User access and role management is enforced to limit operational staff to only conducting the operations they have been authorized and cleared for. Dedicated user access forms are continuously maintained by the GOV-CA operations manager. These forms are used as part of the regular internal audits performed by the PMA audit and compliance function on the GOV-CA operations.

Key splitting techniques are defined and enforced as part of the GOV-CA key management policies and procedures. This ensures that no single individual may gain access to GOV-CA private keys.

PKI operators with HSM administrators are involved in GOV-CA key operations, such as GOV-CA system start-up and GOV-CA system shutdown, key backup or key recovery operation.

The AGCE PKI GB ensures that all operational activity performed by GOV-CA staff in trusted roles is logged and maintained in a verifiable and secure audit trail.

5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

Before exercising the responsibilities of a trusted role:

- The AGCE PKI GB confirms the identity and history of the employee by carrying out background and security checks;
- When instructed through the internal PKI GB processes, the facility operations team issues an access card to each staff who needs to physically access equipment located in the secure enclave;
- GOV- CA dedicated staff (system administrators) issue the necessary ICT system credentials for GOV-CA staff to perform their respective functions.

5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

AGCE ensures separation of duties among the following work groups:

- Operating personnel (manages operations on certificates, key custodians, helpdesk etc.);
- Administrative personnel (system admins, network admins, HSM admins etc.);
- Security personnel (enforce security measures);
- Audit personnel (review audit logs).

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The procedural controls listed in the previous clauses related to the GOV-CA shall apply to the AGCE issuing CAs.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall implement procedural controls that at minimum, are in line with the GOV-CA procedural controls listed above.

5.3 Personnel Controls

GOV-CA

The PKI GB mandates the implementation of security controls for the duties and roles of the staff members in charge of the GOV-CA activities.

The GOV-CA's personnel security controls include the following:

5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

All GOV-CA personnel fulfilling trusted roles are selected based on skills, experience, integrity and background check. The following checks are performed:

- Obtaining testimonials from references;
- CV contents verification;
- Specific security clearances as required;
- Validation of degrees, certifications, or credentials/awards submitted by the candidate;
- Misrepresentations or omission of relevant data.

The requirements related to minimum qualifications are documented in the PMA governance document and other internal PMA documents, which are given to the AGCE PKI GB. While performing any critical operation on the GOV-CA systems, trusted roles are to be held by an Algerian national only.

5.3.2 Background Check Procedures

All employees filling trusted roles are selected based on integrity, background investigation and security clearance. The AGCE PKI GB ensures that these checks are performed once yearly for all personnel holding trusted roles.

5.3.3   Training Requirements

The PKI GB makes available relevant technical personnel to perform their respective role. A comprehensive training curriculum is prepared and delivered as part of the establishment of the GOV-CA operations. This training is regularly updated and delivered on a yearly basis to GOV-CA personnel.

The training curriculum is delivered by a mix of GOV-CA experienced staff and third parties specialized in security and PKI. It is designed to address the needs of the various trusted roles involved in operating and delivering the GOV-CA services. In particular, the training curriculum covers basic and advanced topics necessary for the GOV-CA RA and PKI administrators (i.e. validation specialists) to master the RA processes and related verification and vetting processes.

The topics covered in the training are:

- PKI theory and principles
- PKI environmental controls and security policies
- PKI RA processes including vetting and verification procedures
- PKI operational processes
- PKI products hands-on training
- PKI trusted roles management
- PKI disaster recovery and business continuity procedures
- PKI latest trends and technology developments

The PKI GB maintains documentation on all personnel who attended training and monitors the satisfaction levels of the trainers on all trainees. Examination tests are organized at the end of the training sessions and certificates delivered to the staff that pass successfully the examination tests. No trusted role, including the validation specialists, will be allowed to operate without passing successfully the examinations tests.

5.3.4   Retraining frequency and requirements

The training curriculum is delivered to all GOV-CA personnel. The training content is reviewed and amended on a yearly basis to reflect the latest leading practices and GOV-CA configuration changes.

5.3.5   Job rotation frequency and sequence

The PKI GB ensures that any change in the GOV-CA staff will not affect the operational effectiveness, continuity and integrity of the GOV-CA services.

5.3.6   Sanctions for unauthorized actions

For the purpose of maintaining accountability on GOV-CA personnel, the PKI GB shall sanction personnel for unauthorized actions, unauthorized use of authority and unauthorized use of systems, according to the relevant human resources policy and procedures, and the applicable Algerian law.

5.3.7   Independent contractor requirements

The AGCE does not employ independent contractors as part of its operations and trusted roles are exclusively held by Algerian nationals.

Whenever independent contractors and third parties are involved for maintenance and operational support purposes, the PKI GB ensures that the engaged personnel are subject to the same background check, security control and training as permanent CA staff.

5.3.8   Documentation supplied to personnel

The AGCE PKI GB shall document all training material and make it available to GOV-CA personnel. The PKI GB also ensures that key documentation related to GOV-CA operations is made available to the personnel. This includes, at a minimum, this CP/CPS document, security policies and the technical documentation relevant to every trusted role.

5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA systems operated by the GOV-CA operations team shall maintain an audit trail for material events and operations executed on the GOV-CA systems. This includes key life cycle management, including key generation, backup, storage, recovery, destruction and the management of cryptographic devices, the CA and OCSP responder. Security audit log files for all events relating to the security of the CA, RA and OCSP responder shall be generated and preserved. These logs shall be reviewed by the GOV-CA security monitoring team, and are also reviewed as part of the regular internal audits performed by the AGCE PKI GB audit function on GOV-CA operations.

The AGCE PKI GB ensures that the following controls are implemented:

5.4.1 Types of Event Recorded

Audit log files are generated for all events relating to the security and services of the GOV-CA CA. Where possible, the audit logs are automatically generated and where not possible, a logbook or paper forms are used. The audit logs, both electronic and non-electronic, are retained by the GOV-CA operations team and may be made available during compliance audits.

Following events occurring in relation to the GOV-CA operations are recorded:

- GOV-CA key life cycle management events, including:
  - Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival and destruction
  - Cryptographic device life-cycle management events
- GOV-CA and GOV-CA Subscribing CAs Certificate life-cycle management events, including:
  - Certificate requests, re-key requests, and revocation
  - All issued certificates including revoked and expired Certificates
  - Verification activities evidence (e.g. date, time, calls, persons communicated with)
  - Acceptance and rejection of certificate requests
  - Issuance of certificates
  - CRL updates (including OCSP entries updates where applicable)
- Security events, including:
  - Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts
  - PKI and security system actions performed
  - Security profiles and configuration changes
  - User management operations
  - System platform issues (e.g. crashes), hardware failures
  - Firewall and router activities
  - Entries an exists from the CA facility

Log entries will include at minimum the following elements:

1. Date and time of entry
2. Identity of the person/system making the log entry
3. Description of the entry

5.4.2 Frequency for Processing and Archiving Audit Logs

The AGCE PKI GB ensures that designated personnel review log files at regular intervals in order to validate log integrity and ensure timely identification of anomalous events. At a minimum, the following audit log review cycle is implemented by the AGCE PKI GB:

- GOV-CA application and security audit logs shall be reviewed by the security operations team on a daily basis, as part of the regular daily operations;
- On a monthly basis, senior PKI operations management reviews the applications and systems logs to validate the integrity of the logging processes and to test/confirm the daily monitoring function is being operated properly;

- On a quarterly basis, senior PKI operation management reviews the physical access logs and the user management on the GOV-CA systems with an objective to continuously validate the on-going physical and logical access policies;
- At least once yearly, the AGCE PKI GB audit and compliance function executes an internal audit of the GOV-CA operations. Samples of the audit logs produced since the last audit cycle shall be requested by the PKI GB as part of this internal audit;
- Evidence of audit log reviews, outcome of the review process, and executed remediation actions are collected and archived.

5.4.3   Retention Period for Audit Log

The GOV-CA operations team ensures that the audit logs are maintained and retained for a period not less than 2 years. These may be made available to auditors upon request.

5.4.4   Protection of Audit Log

Audit logs are protected by a combination of physical, procedural and technical security controls as follows:

- The GOV-CA systems generates cryptographically protected audit logs;
- The security of audits logs is maintained while these logs transit by the backup system and when these logs are archived;
- The access control policies enforced on the GOV-CA systems ensures that read access only is granted to personnel having access to audit logs as part of their operational duties;
- Only authorized roles can obtain access to systems where audit logs are stored and any attempts to tamper with audit logs can be tracked to the respective GOV-CA operations personnel.

5.4.5   Audit Log Backup Procedures

The following rules apply for the backup of the GOV-CA audit log:

- Backup media are stored locally in the GOV-CA main site, in a secure location;
- A second copy of the audit log data and files are stored in the disaster recovery site that provides similar physical and environmental security as the main site.

5.4.6   Audit Collection System (internal vs. external)

The audit log collection system is an integral system of the GOV-CA internal support systems. Refer to section 5.4.4 for the protection of audit logs.

5.4.7   Notification to Event-causing Subject

Where an event is logged by the audit collection system, no notice is required to be given to the individual, organization, device or application that caused the event.

5.4.8   Vulnerability Assessments

The GOV-CA systems and infrastructure shall be subject to regular security assessment as follows:

- Quarterly automated vulnerability scan of all public and internal IP addresses of GOV-CA core and supporting PKI systems. This regular self-assessment activity is executed by security personnel part of the GOV-CA operations team;

- On an annual basis and before the yearly WebTrust audit is planned, the AGCE PKI GB coordinates with the PMA to ensure a third-party independent vulnerability assessment and penetration testing is conducted on the GOV-CA systems;

The outcome of the regular assessments and identified issues shall be made available to the GOV-CA upper PKI operations management, who shall be responsible to organize and oversee the execution of the remediations by the respective teams.

Evidence of the vulnerability assessment and penetration testing activities' execution are collected and archived by the relevant GOV-CA personnel.

The AGCE PKI GB operational cycle also includes an annual risk assessment which targets the identification of potential new internal and external threats, assess the likelihood and potential damage of these threats and assess the adequacy of the existing implemented controls. Based on the risk assessment results (which coincides with the annual external vulnerability and penetration testing exercise), the GOV-CA higher PKI operational management will develop and present a security plan to the PKI GB seeking the necessary approvals to proceed with the remediation implementation.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The audit and logging security controls listed in the previous clauses related to the GOV-CA shall apply to the AGCE issuing CAs.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall implement audit and logging security controls that at minimum, are in line with the GOV-CA controls listed above.

5.5 Records Archival

5.5.1 Types of records archived

The GOV-CA operations team ensures that at least the following records are archived:

- All documentation relating to certificate requests and the verification thereof, and all Certificates and revocation thereof ;
- Key ceremony documentation and related verification information;

5.5.2 Retention period for archive

The AGCE retains all documentation relating to certificate requests and the verification thereof, and all Certificates and revocation thereof, for 7 years after any certificate issuance by the GOV-CA.

5.5.3 Protection of archive

Records are archived in such a way that they cannot be deleted or destroyed. Controls are in place to ensure that only authorized personnel can manage the archive without diminishing integrity, authenticity, or confidentiality of the records.

Archived records are protected by a combination of physical, procedural and technical security controls as follows. Archived records are securely maintained using the access control mechanisms enforced by the GOV-CA support systems. These policies ensure that the appropriate rights access are granted to personnel having access to all archived records as part of their operational duties.

5.5.4 Archive backup procedures

Only one version of each digital archive is maintained in the primary and disaster recovery facilities of the GOV-CA. The GOV-CA operations team use backup, restore and archive procedures that document how the archive information is created, transmitted and stored.

5.5.5 Requirements For Time-stamping of records

All recorded and archived events include the date and time of the event taking place. The time of GOV-CA systems is synchronized with the time source of a GPS clock. Further, the GOV-CA operations team enforce a procedure that checks and corrects any clock drift.

5.5.6 Archive Collectionsystem (internal or external)

Only authorized and authenticated staff shall be allowed to access archived material. The GOV-CA operations team use the GOV-CA backup, restore and archive procedures that document how the archive information is created, transmitted and stored. These procedures also provide information on the archive collection system.

5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

Refer to clause 5.5.6.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The audit records archival security controls listed in the previous clauses related to the GOV-CA shall apply to the AGCE issuing CAs.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall implement audit record archival security controls that at minimum, are in line with the GOV-CA controls listed above.

5.6 Key Changeover

To minimize impact of key compromise, the GOV-CA key shall be changed with a frequency that ensures the GOV-CA shall have a validity period greater than the maximum lifetime of Subscriber certificate after the latest Subscriber certificate issuance.

Refer to section 6.3.2 of this CP/CPS document for key changeover frequency.

5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures

GOV-CA

The PKI GB has a Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Plan that documents the procedures necessary to restore the GOV-CA services in case of business failure, disaster or security compromise. The PKI GB may disclose the plan to its auditors upon request.

The PKI GB annually tests, reviews, and enhances the Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Plan. The following topics are covered in the plan:

- The conditions for activating the plan
- Emergency procedures
- Fallback procedures
- Resumption procedures
- A maintenance schedule for the plan
- Awareness and education requirements
- The responsibilities of the individuals
- Recovery time objective (RTO)
- Regular testing of contingency plans

- The CA's plan to maintain or restore the CA's business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes
- A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location
- What constitutes an acceptable system outage and recovery time
- How frequently backup copies of essential business information and software are taken
- The distance of recovery facilities to the CA's main site and
- Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster and prior to restoring a secure environment either at the original or a remote site.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The incident and compromise handling procedures related to the GOV-CA listed above shall apply to the AGCE issuing CAs.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall implement incident and compromise handling procedures that at minimum, are in line with the GOV-CA arrangements listed above in addition to the relevant requirements indorsed by the national TSP CP.

5.7.2   Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA PKI operations team shall implement the necessary measures to ensure full recovery of the GOV-CA services in case of a disaster, corrupted servers, software or data. Communication with the AGCE PKI GB occurs to authorize the triggering of the required incident recovery procedures.

The GOV-CA disaster recovery and business continuity document lists the incidents that affects the GOV-CA operations and that require the execution of specific recovery procedures. If the GOV-CA operational capabilities are affected due to corrupted servers, software or data, the recovery procedures will involve the disaster recovery site.

The GOV-CA disaster recovery and business continuity plan is tested at least once a year, including failover scenarios to the disaster recovery location.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The provisions implemented for the GOV-CA, to cope with software/resources/data corruption, shall apply to the AGCE issuing CAs.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall implement controls to protect their CA systems from software/resources/data corruption. These controls at minimum, are in line with the GOV-CA arrangements listed above in addition to the relevant requirements indorsed by the national TSP CP.

5.7.3   Entity private key compromise procedures

GOV-CA

Compromise of the GOV-CA private key(s), or of the associated activation data is considered as a mission-critical incident that triggers a process and related procedures, detailed in the AGCE disaster recovery and business continuity plan.

Considering the criticality of such compromise situation and its impact on the Algeria national PKI, the PMA and the PKI GB hold an exceptional meeting. Refer to sections 4.9.1 and 4.9.3 for further details.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The AGCE issuing CA are subject to private key compromise handling procedures similar to the once described above for the GOV-CA.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall enforce private key compromise procedures related to their CAs.

5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster

GOV-CA

In case of a disaster, corrupted servers, software or data, the GOV-CA disaster recovery and business continuity plan is triggered in order to restore the minimum GOV-CA required operational capabilities, in a timely fashion. In particular, the plan targets the recovery of the following services, either on the primary site, or the disaster recovery site:

- Public repository where CRLs and GOV-CA certificates are published;
- GOV-CA OCSP service.

Failover scenarios to the GOV-CA disaster recovery location are made possible considering the GOV-CA backup system that enables the continuous replication of critical GOV-CA data from the primary site to the disaster recovery site.

The GOV-CA disaster recovery and business recovery plan is tested at least once a year, including failover scenarios to the disaster recovery site. The plan demonstrates the recovery of the GOV-CA critical services at the disaster recovery location within a maximum of twelve (12) hours RTO.

The business continuity and disaster recovery plan includes, at a minimum, the following information:

1. Conditions for activating the plan;
2. Fall-back and resumption procedures;
3. The responsibilities of the individuals involved in the plan execution;
4. Recovery time objective (RTO);
5. Recovery procedures;
6. The plan to maintain or restore the business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes;
7. Key termination plan (in case of GOV-CA key compromise);
8. Procedures for securing the main facility to the extent possible during the period following a disaster and up to recovery of operations in a secure environment in either the main, or secondary site.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The AGCE issuing CA are setup as part of the subject to business continuity capabilities (after disaster) similar to the once described above for the GOV-CA.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall implement business continuity capabilities (after disaster) as part of their operations.

5.8   CA or RA Termination

GOV-CA

Refer to clauses 4.9 and 5.7 of this CP/CPS for GOV-CA key compromise and revocation.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

Refer to clauses 4.9 and 5.7 of this CP/CPS for GOV-CA key compromise and revocation.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall have a Termination Plan duly tested and ready to be triggered when required.

6   Technical Security Controls

This clause defines the security measures the PKI GB takes to protect its cryptographic keys and activation data (e.g. PINs, passwords, and key access tokens).

6.1   Key Pair Generation and Installation

The GOV-CA shall implement and document key generation procedures in accordance with this CP/CPS.

6.1.1   Key Pair Generation

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA key generation ceremony is planned in advance and full dry runs are executed before the live ceremonies can be planned. The ceremony is subject to the formal authorization of the PKI GB. The ceremony requires HSMs that meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3, and a dedicated machine to be setup by authorized GOV-CA personnel only. The detailed key ceremony activities are documented in the GOV-CA key ceremony procedure and related ceremony log. The ceremony involves the execution of technical procedures through which the GOV-CA personnel setup the GOV-CA software and trigger the GOV-CA key pair generation and self-signed certificate creation through the GOV-CA HSM. The trusted personnel involved in the GOV-CA key generation ceremony select their own secrets and HSM activation data is then generated. All GOV-CA private key material, secrets and activation data is maintained in tamper evident envelopes during the entire lifecycle of the GOV-CA private key.

The GOV-CA Key Generation Ceremony is witnessed by a WebTrust qualified auditor. The activities performed in each GOV-CA key generation ceremony are recorded, dated and signed by all individuals involved. These records are kept for audit and tracking purposes for a period of time defined in the GOV-CA backup and archive procedures.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The key ceremony for an AGCE issuing CA key generation is planned in advance, and full dry runs are executed before the live ceremonies can be planned. The ceremony is subject to the formal authorization of the PKI GB. The ceremony requires HSMs that meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3, and a dedicated machine to be setup by authorized personnel only. The detailed key ceremony activities are documented in key ceremony documentation from the AGCE and related ceremony log.

The ceremony involves the execution of technical procedures through which the AGCE PKI operations team setups the issuing CA software and triggers the key pair generation of the issuing CA. The GOV-CA software rejects the processing of certificate request from a Subscribing CA if the requested public key does not meet the requirements set forth in Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 or if it has a known weak Private Key.

The key ceremony is then completed including the generation of the issuing CA certificate by the AGCE GOV-CA. The private key material, secrets and activation data of the AGCE issuing CA is maintained in tamper evident envelopes during the entire lifecycle of the issuing CA private key.

The AGCE issuing CA Key Generation Ceremony is witnessed by the AGCE PKI GB and the PMA audit functions.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The AGCE PKI GB oversees the establishment of the Government TSP and approves their respective ceremonies after the completion of several verifications including the successful completion of a surveillance audit on the TSP operations. The key generation ceremony for the TSP CA is witnessed by the AGCE PKI GB audit function. The security measures that are in place for the key generation of the TSP CAs shall be described in their respective CPS.

6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber

The GOV-CA does not generate private keys for Subscribers.

6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

For the AGCE issuing CAs, the public key certificate is available as part of the certificate application processing. Refer to clauses 4.3 and 4.4 of this CP/CPS document for further details.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP certificate request is processed as part of GOV-CA ceremonies which result in the generation of the TSP CA certificate that is handed over to the TSP representative. The public key is then imported into the target TSP CA systems. Refer to clauses 4.3, 4.4 and 6.1.1 of this CP/CPS for further details.

6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties

The GOV-CA operations team ensures the GOV-CA certificate and the Subordinate CA certificates are published on the AGCE public repository.

6.1.5 Key sizes

GOV-CA

The minimum size for the GOV-CA Root CA Keys using the RSA SHA-256 algorithm is 4096 bits.

Subscribing CAs

The minimum size for subscribing CAs keys using the RSA SHA-256 algorithm is 4096 bits.

6.1.6 Public key parameter generation and quality checking

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA public Key module generation is done with HSM devices that that conforms to FIPS 186-2 for random generation and primality checks. The GOV-CA operations team references the Baseline Requirements Section 6.1.6 on quality checking.

Subscribing CAs

Same provisions shall apply for subscribing CAs public key parameter generation.

6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

GOV-CA

Private Keys corresponding to the GOV-CA Certificates shall not be used to sign Certificates except in the following cases:

- Certificates for Subordinate or Issuing CAs;

- And certificates for Subscribing GOV-CAs OCSP responder.

Subscribing CAs

The Subscribing CAs uses private signing keys only for signing CRLs and applicant certification services in accordance with the intended use of each of these keys. Other usages are restricted. Certificates issued to subscribing CA shall always contain key usage bit string in accordance with RFC 5280.

- keyCertSign;

- cRLSign.

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

The GOV-CA operations team implements physical and logical safeguards to prevent unauthorized certificate issuance. The GOV-CA private key never exists during normal operations outside cryptographic hardware that are certified/validated for FIPS 140-2 Level 3. Backup copies are taken for business continuity purposes and are also held securely inside FIPS 140-2 Level 3 cryptographic hardware. The protection of the GOV-CA private key must consist at all times of physical security, encryption, or a combination of both, implemented in a manner that prevents disclosure of the CA private key. When encryption is used (i.e. to create backups of the CA private key), algorithms and key-lengths are used that, according to the state of the art, are capable of withstanding cryptanalytic attacks for the residual life of the encrypted key or key part.

6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA relies on secure cryptographic device in the form of Hardware Security Modules (HSM) certified/validated for FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The GOV-CA HSMs are maintained and held securely within the most inner and secure zone of the GOV-CA facility.

Subscribing CAs

GOV-CA provisions shall apply to subscribing CAs that shall use certified/validated for FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or equivalent levels of security certification.

6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA private keys are continuously controlled by multiple authorised persons, trusted roles in relation to GOV-CA private keys (and related secrets) management are documented in the GOV-CA key ceremony document, and other internal documentation.

GOV-CA personnel are assigned to the trusted roles by the AGCE PKI GB ensuring segregation of duties and enforcing the principles of multi control and split knowledge. Multi-person control of the GOV-CA private key is achieved using an "m-of-n" split key knowledge scheme. A certain number of persons 'm' (at least two (2)), out of 'n' persons (three (3) persons), the total number of key custodians, need to be concurrently present, together with HSMs administrators and a PKI GB staff, to activate or re-activate the GOV-CA private key. The PKI GB keeps written, auditable, records of tokens and related password distribution to trusted operatives and key custodians. In case trusted operatives or key custodians are to be replaced, it will keep track of the renewed tokens and/or password distribution.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CA is deployed in the same facility where the GOV-CA is deployed. It is operated by the same operations team operating the GOV-CA. The AGCE issuing CA are subject to private key shared control similar to the once described above for the GOV-CA.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The TSP shall enforce private key shared control procedures to their CAs.

6.2.3   Private key escrow

GOV-CA

Private keys of the GOV-CA are not escrowed. Dedicated backup and restore procedures of the GOV-CA private key are implemented by the PMA.

Subscribing CAs

Private keys of the subscribing CAs may not be escrowed.

6.2.4   Private key backup

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA private key is backed up and held stored safely in exclusive safes maintained in the most inner security zones of the PKI facilities. Backup operations are executed as part of the GOV-CA key generation ceremonies. The GOV-CA key is backed up under the same dual control and split knowledge as the primary key. The recovery operation of the backup key is subject to the same dual control and split knowledge principles.

The GOV-CA private keys that are physically transported from the primary facility to the DR one using a dedicated HSM handling and key handling procedure part of the overall GOV-CA key ceremony documentation. Dedicated personnel in trusted roles participate in the transport operation, which is escorted by security guards. Refer to clause 6.2.2 for further details.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are deployed in the same facilities where the GOV-CA is deployed. Their key generation ceremonies, including the backup of CA private keys, are subject to the same security measures, dual control and split knowledge that apply to the GOV-CA private key backup.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

The backup and management of TSP CAs private keys shall be subject to the same security measures and controls that apply to the GOV-CA private key backup.

6.2.5   Private key archival

The GOV-CA operations team does not archive the GOV-CA private keys.

6.2.6   Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA uses FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certified/validated HSMs for the primary and disaster recovery facilities. GOV-CA private key and related secret material are backed up as part of the audited key generation ceremonies. Key backup operations are executed through HSM token-to-token operations ensuring encrypted key backups are generated with the enforcement of dual control and split knowledge mechanisms. The recovery operations are subject to the same dual control and split knowledge principles. Key backups are transported to the backup PKI facility where recovery operations may be executed as part of the Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity plan. The transfer and recovery operations are subject to the same dual control and split knowledge principles.

If during a transfer operation, the GOV-CA private key has been compromised and potentially communicated to an unauthorized person or organization, then the PKI GB will trigger the key compromise procedure as part of the Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity plan. All certificates issued by the transferred private key will be revoked.

Subscribing CAs

Same provisions, related to GOV-CA private key transfer to/from cryptographic modules, shall apply to subscribing CAs private key transfer.

6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module

No further stipulation other than those stated in clauses 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.4 and 6.2.6.

6.2.8 Method of activating private key

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA private key is activated inside the HSM as part of audited key ceremonies attended by several trusted personnel and relevant PKI GB personnel. The principles of dual control and split knowledge are enforced so that each trusted personnel involved in the ceremony holds his own set of secrets/activation data/key share. The GOV-CA key remain active only for the duration of the activity requiring the GOV-CA activation (e.g. certification, CRL generation). The details of GOV-CA private keys activation are documented in the GOV-CA key ceremony documentation.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CA are controlled by AGCE and operated by the PKI operations team in charge of the GOV-CA. The same principles of dual control and split knowledge, applied for the activation of the GOV-CA, shall apply for the AGCE issuing CA private keys activation.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

TSPs activate their own private keys. The same security measures and methods to activate GOV-CA private keys shall apply to activating the private keys of TSP CA private keys.

6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key

GOV-CA

The HSMs used for the GOV-CA key ceremony are deactivated at the end of the ceremony which prevents any further use of the GOV-CA private keys. This activity applies to the principles of dual control and split knowledge, and shall always be witnessed by the relevant personnel (PKI GB, auditor). The HSMs are safely powered off at the end of the ceremony, and all material used during the ceremony is put back in their respective safes.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE issuing CAs are controlled by AGCE and operated by the PKI operations team in charge of the GOV-CA. The security measures applied for deactivating the GOV-CA private key are enforced for the AGCE issuing CAs.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

Similar provisions related to GOV-CA private key deactivation, shall apply to the TSP CA private key deactivation.

6.2.10 Method of destroying private key

GOV-CA

At the end of their lifetime, the GOV-CA private keys shall be irrevocably destroyed in the presence of all at least three (3) trusted GOV-CA personnel, and at least one (1) PMA representative.

The GOV-CA keys are destroyed by permanently removing them from any hardware module the keys are stored on. The hardware module will be then reset or returned to its factory state.

The GOV-CA private key destruction outside the context of the end of its lifetime applies to investigation and special authorization from the PMA.

The key destruction process is detailed in the dedicated key ceremony documentation. Any associated records are archived, including a report evidencing the key destruction process.

Subscribing CAs – AGCE issuing CA

The AGCE enforces the same provisions that apply for GOV-CA private key destruction, to the private key destruction of the AGCE issuing CA.

Subscribing CAs – Government TSP

Same provisions, related to GOV-CA private key destruction, shall apply to the TSP subscribing CAs private key destruction.

6.2.11   Cryptographic Module Rating

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA cryptographic modules are certified/validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 3.

Subscribing CAs

The subscribing CAs cryptographic modules shall be certified/validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 3.

6.3   Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1   Public key archival

See clause 5.5 for archival conditions.

6.3.2   Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

The GOV-CA certificate shall have a validity period at least greater than the last Subscriber certificate it issued, augmented with a grace period that takes into account the GOV-CA key ceremony procedure.

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA certificates shall be valid for seventeen (17) years, with a key usage period for signing Subscriber certificates of five (5) years. After five (5) years, the CA certificate will continue to be used for signing CRL but does not issue any new subscriber certificates.

Subscribing CAs

In the case of a subordinate (non-issuing) TSP CA, the provisions of this CP/CPS suggest TSP CA certificates valid for twelve (12) years, with a key usage period of four (4) years.

In the case of an issuing CA for the TSP (issuing certificates for end-users), the provisions of this CP/CPS suggest TSP CA certificates valid for eight (8) years, with a key usage period of three (3) years.

6.4   Activation Data

6.4.1   Activation data generation and installation

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA private key and related HSM activation data is generated during the GOV-CA private key generation ceremony. Refer to clauses 6.1.1 and 6.2.8 of this CP/CPS for further details.

Subscribing CAs

The subscribing CA's activation data generation and installation shall be subject to the same security controls as the GOV-CA activation data generation and installation.

6.4.2　Activation data protection

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA private key and related HSM activation data is generated during the GOV-CA private key generation ceremony. The protection mechanisms applied on the GOV-CA keys apply also to the HSM and keys activation data. Refer to clauses 6.1.1 and 6.2.8 of this CP/CPS for further details.

Subscribing CAs

The subscribing CA's activation data protection shall be subject to the same security controls as the GOV-CA activation data protection.

6.4.3　Other aspects of activation data

No stipulation.

6.5　Computer Security Controls

6.5.1　Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA operations team is subject to the security controls documented in the GOV-CA policy manual. The GOV-CA is operated according to the following minimum security arrangements:

- Separation of duties and dual controls for CA operations;
- Physical and logical access control enforcement;
- Audit of application and security related events;
- Continuous monitoring of GOV-CA systems and end-point protection;
- Backup and recovery mechanisms for GOV-CA operations;
- Hardening of GOV-CA servers' operating system according to leading practices and vendor recommendations;
- In-depth network security architecture including perimeter and internal firewalls, web application firewalls, including intrusion detection systems;
- Proactive patch management as part of the GOV-CA operational processes;
- The GOV-CA systems enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance.

The AGCE PKI GB organizes regular (at minimum once a year) internal audit to monitor the GOV-CA operations against the target security controls. The GOV-CA is also subject to regular surveillance audits from the PMA.

Subscribing CAs

Subscribing CA shall be operated according to the same security controls as listed above for the GOV-CA. This applies to the AGCE issuing CA, as well to other government TSP CAs.

6.5.2　Computer Security Rating

The GOV-CA computer running the certification authority software is positively tested in accordance with the requirements of NATO Publications of SDIP-27 Level B (TEMPEST).

6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1 System Development Controls

GOV-CA

Purchased hardware or software are to be shipped in a sealed, tamper-proof container, and installed by qualified personnel. Hardware and software updates are to be procured in the same manner as the original equipment. Dedicated GOV-CA trusted personnel are involved to implement the required GOV-CA configuration according to documented operational procedures.

Applications are tested, developed and implemented in accordance with industry leading development and change management practices. No software (or patches), or hardware is deployed on live systems before going through the change and configuration management processes enforced by the GOV-CA operations team.

All GOV-CA hardware and software platforms are hardened using industry best practices and vendor recommendations.

Subscribing CAs

The subscribing CA's shall be subject to the same system development controls as the GOV-CA.

6.6.2 Security Management Controls

GOV-CA

The hardware and software used to set up the GOV-CA shall be dedicated to performing only CA-related tasks. There shall be no other applications, hardware devices, network connections or component software, which are not part of the PKI, connected to or installed on CA hardware.

The GOV-CA equipment is scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter. Authorised personnel must ensure up-to-date virus definition databases in place before each GOV-CA usage.

Refer to clause 6.6.1 for further details.

Subscribing CAs

The subscribing CA's shall be subject to the same security management controls as the GOV-CA.

6.6.3 Life-Cycle Security controls

Refer to 6.5.1.

6.7 Network security controls

GOV-CA

The GOV-CA is operated as an offline CA not connected to any network. The GOV-CA equipment and secret material are maintained in security safe located in innermost security zone of the GOV-CA facility.

The GOV-CA repository and OCSP responder are online systems supporting the GOV-CA operations and enabling service provision to relying parties, in compliance with the provisions of this CP/CPS. An in-depth network security architecture is enforced, including perimeter and internal firewalls, web application firewalls, end-point protection, including intrusion detection systems. The network is segmented into several zones based on a defined conceptual and functional architecture for the GOV-CA systems. These controls and technologies limit the services allowed to and from the GOV-CA online services.

The PMA ensures regular vulnerability testing is conducted on the GOV-CA online services. The AGCE PKI GB also ensures that at least once a year, penetration testing is conducted on the GOV-CA connected systems, by an independent third-party.

Subscribing CAs

The subscribing CA's network protection shall be subject to the same network security controls as the GOV-CA network.

6.8 Time-stamping

GOV-CA

It is the machine time that is used for generating the archived record.

There is no NTP service available for the GOV-CA offline machine. The time is the GOV-CA's machine time that is verified by the quorum in charge of activating the GOV-CA during the ceremonies.

An NTP server is available as part of the GOV-CA connected infrastructure. It is used to synchronize the time of the servers that are part of the GOV-CA connected infrastructure, including the OCSP service and online repository.

Subscribing CAs

The CA servers' internal clock shall be synchronized using the NTP service.

7 Certificates, CRL, and OCSP Profiles

7.1 Certificate Profile

Corporate CA

Corporate CA					
Field	CE[2]	O/M[3]	CO[4]	Value	Comment
Certificate		M			
TBSCertificate		M			See 4.1.2 of RFC 5280
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	Intermediate Subordinate CA's Signature.	Intermediate Subordinate CA's signature value
TBSCertificate					
Version	False	M			
Version		M	S	2	Version 3
SerialNumber	False				

CertificateSerialNumber		M	D		At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
Issuer	False	M	S		
CountryName				DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName				AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE	UTF8 encoded
CommonName				Government CA	UTF8 encoded
Validity	False	M			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
NotBefore		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time.	
NotAfter		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time + **[96]** Months	Suggested validity for the Subordinate issuing CA is 8 years
Subject	False	M	D		
CountryName				DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName				AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE	UTF8 encoded
CommonName				Corporate CA	UTF8 encoded

SubjectPublicKeyInfo	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	RSA	
SubjectPublicKey		M	D	Public Key Key length: 4096(RSA)	
Extensions		M			
Authority Properties					
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M			Mandatory in all certificates except for self-signed certificates
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of the issuer CA public key
AuthorityInfoAccess	False	O			
AccessMethod		M	S	*Id-ad-2 1 id-ad-ocsp OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 (ca ocsp)*	OCSP Responder field
AccessLocation		M	D	http://ocsp.pki.agce.dz	OCSP responder URL
AccessMethod		O	S	*Id-ad-2 2 id-ad-caIssuers OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 (ca cert)*	CA Issuers field
AccessLocation		O	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cert/government_ca.p7b	Government CA Certificate/Chain download URL over HTTP
crlDistributionPoints	False	M			
DistributionPoint		M	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/crl/government_ca.crl	CRL download URL
Subject Properties					
SubjectKeyIdentifier	False	M			
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of subjectPublicKey
Policy Properties					
KeyUsage	True	M			
keyCertSign		M	S	True	

cRLSign		M	S	True	
CertificatePolicies	False	O			
PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.16.12.3.2.1.1	
policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId		O	S	id-qt 1	
policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri		O	D	https://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cps	
BasicConstraints	True	M			
CA		M	S	True	TRUE for CA Certificates
pathLenConstraint		M	S	0	It will not allow to sign a CA certificate

Infrastructure CA

Infrastructure CA					
Field	CE[2]	O/M[3]	CO[4]	Value	Comment
Certificate		M			
TBSCertificate		M			See 4.1.2 of RFC 5280
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	Intermediate Subordinate CA's Signature.	Intermediate Subordinate CA's signature value
TBSCertificate					
Version	False	M			
Version		M	S	2	Version 3
SerialNumber	False				
CertificateSerialNumber		M	D		At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.
Signature	False	M			

AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
Issuer	False	**M**	**S**		
CountryName				DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName				AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE	UTF8 encoded
CommonName				Government CA	UTF8 encoded
Validity	False	**M**			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
NotBefore		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time.	
NotAfter		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time + **[96]** Months	Suggested validity for the Subordinate issuing CA is 8 years
Subject	False	**M**	**D**		
CountryName				DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName				AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE	UTF8 encoded
CommonName				Infrastructure CA	UTF8 encoded
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	False	**M**			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	RSA	
SubjectPublicKey		M	D	Public Key	

				Key length: 4096(RSA)	
Extensions		M			
Authority Properties					
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M			Mandatory in all certificates except for self-signed certificates
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of the issuer CA public key
AuthorityInfoAccess	False	O			
AccessMethod		M	S	*Id-ad-2 1 id-ad-ocsp OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 (ca ocsp)*	OCSP Responder field
AccessLocation		M	D	http://ocsp.pki.agce.dz	OCSP responder URL
AccessMethod		O	S	*Id-ad-2 2 id-ad-caIssuers OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 (ca cert)*	CA Issuers field
AccessLocation		O	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cert/government_ca.p7b	Intermediate Subordinate CA Certificate/Chain download URL over HTTP
crlDistributionPoints	False	M			
DistributionPoint		M	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/crl/government_ca.crl	CRL download URL
Subject Properties					
SubjectKeyIdentifier	False	M			
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of subjectPublicKey
Policy Properties					
KeyUsage	True	M			
keyCertSign		M	S	True	
cRLSign		M	S	True	
CertificatePolicies	False	O			

PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.16.12.3.2.1.1	
policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId		O	S	id-qt 1	
policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri		O	D	https://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cps	
BasicConstraints	True	M			
CA		M	S	True	TRUE for CA Certificates
pathLenConstraint		M	S	0	It will not allow to sign a CA certificate

Subscribing CA certificate profile – TSP intermediate CA (non-issuing)

Government TSP IntermediateCA Certificate Profile					
Field	CE[2]	O/M[3]	CO[4]	Value	Comment
Certificate		M			
TBSCertificate		M	S		See 4.1.2 of RFC 5280
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	Government CA's Signature.	Government CA's signature value
TBSCertificate					
Version	False	M			
Version		M	S	2	Version 3
SerialNumber	False				
CertificateSerialNumber		M	D		At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
Issuer	False	M	S		

CountryName				DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName				AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE	UTF8 encoded
CommonName				Government CA	UTF8 encoded
Validity	False	M			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
NotBefore		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time.	
NotAfter		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time + **[144]** Months	Suggested validity for is 12 years as per key changeover rules
Subject	False	M	D		
CountryName		M	S	DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationUnitName		O	D	Allocated as per certificate request	UTF8 encoded
OrganizationName		M	D	Allocated as per certificate request	UTF8 encoded
CommonName		M	D	Allocated as per certificate request	UTF8 encoded
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	RSA	
SubjectPublicKey		M	D	Public Key Key length: 4096(RSA)	
Extensions		M			
Authority Properties					

AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M			Mandatory in all certificates except for self-signed certificates
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of the issuer CA public key
AuthorityInfoAccess	False	O			
AccessMethod		M	S	*Id-ad-2 1 id-ad-ocsp OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 (ca ocsp)*	OCSP Responder field
AccessLocation		M	D	http://ocsp.pki.agce.dz	OCSP responder URL
AccessMethod		O	S	*Id-ad-2 2 id-ad-caIssuers OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 (ca cert)*	CA Issuers field
AccessLocation		O	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cert/government_ca.p7b	Government CA Certificate/Chain download URL over HTTP
crlDistributionPoints	False	M			
DistributionPoint		M	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/crl/government_ca.crl	CRL download URL
Subject Properties					
SubjectKeyIdentifier	False	M			
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of subjectPublicKey
Policy Properties					
KeyUsage	True	M			
keyCertSign		M	S	True	
cRLSign		M	S	True	
ExtendedKeyUsage	False	M			
clientAuthentication		O	S	True	
emailProtection		O	S	True	
id-kp-OCSPSigning		O	S	True	

CertificatePolicies	False	O			
PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.16.12.3.2.1.1	
policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId		O	S	id-qt 1	
policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri		O	D	https://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cps	
BasicConstraints	True	M			
CA		M	S	True	TRUE for CA Certificates
pathLenConstraint		M	S	1	

Subscribing CA certificate profile – TSP issuing CA

Government TSPIssuing CA Certificate Profile					
Field	CE[2]	O/M[3]	CO[4]	Value	Comment
Certificate		M			
TBSCertificate		M	S		See 4.1.2 of RFC 5280
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	Issuing CA Signature	Issuing CA Signature Value
TBSCertificate					
Version	False	M			
Version		M	S	2	Version 3
SerialNumber	False				
CertificateSerialNumber		M	D		At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption

Issuer	False		S		
CountryName		M		DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName		M		AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE or *<OrganizationName of the Government Entity level 1 CA>*	UTF8 encoded
OrganizationUnitName		O	D	Not present if the issuer is Government CA, otherwise it could be the OrganizationUnitName of the Government Entity level 1 CA subject	UTF8 encoded
CommonName		M		Government CA or *<CommonName of TSP intermediate CA>*	UTF8 encoded
Validity	False	M			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
NotBefore		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time.	
NotAfter		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time + **[96]** Months	Suggested validity is 8 years as per key changeover rules
Subject	False	M	D		
CountryName		M	S	DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)

OrganizationUnitName		O	D	Allocated as per certificate request	UTF8 encoded
OrganizationName		M	D	Allocated as per certificate request	UTF8 encoded
CommonName		M	D	Allocated as per certificate request	UTF8 encoded
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	RSA	
SubjectPublicKey		M	D	Public Key Key length: 4096(RSA)	
Extensions		M			
Authority Properties					
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M			Mandatory in all certificates except for self-signed certificates
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of the issuer CA public key
AuthorityInfoAccess	False	O			
AccessMethod		M	S	*Id-ad-2 1 id-ad-ocsp OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 (ca ocsp)*	OCSP Responder field
AccessLocation		M	D	http://ocsp.pki.agce.dz or *<HTTP URL FOR Government Entity Level OCSP Server>*	OCSP responder URL
AccessMethod		O	S	*Id-ad-2 2 id-ad-caIssuers OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 (ca cert)*	CA Issuers field
AccessLocation		O	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cert/government_ca.p7b *or* *<HTTP URL FOR Government Entity Level 1 CA's PKCS7 FILE>*	Issuing CA Certificate/Chain download URL over HTTP

crlDistributionPoints	False	M			
DistributionPoint		M	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/crl/government_ca.crl or *<HTTP URL pointing to CRL issued by Government Entity Level 1 CA>*	CRL download URL
Subject Properties					
SubjectKeyIdentifier	False	M			
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of subjectPublicKey
Policy Properties					
KeyUsage	True	M			
keyCertSign		M	S	True	
cRLSign		M	S	True	
ExtendedKeyUsage	False	M			
clientAuthentication		O	S	True	
emailProtection		O	S	True	
id-kp-OCSPSigning		O	S	True	
CertificatePolicies	False	O			
PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.16.12.3.2.1.1 or *<OID of the Government TSP intermediate CA CPS>*	
policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId		O	S	id-qt 1	
policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri		O	D	https://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cps or *<URL of the Government TSP intermediate CA CPS>*	
BasicConstraints	True	M			
CA		M	S	True	TRUE for CA Certificates

	pathLenConstraint		M	S	0	

7.1.1 Version number(s)

X.509 v3 is supported and used for all certificates related to the GOV-CA (see table in clause 7.1).

7.1.2 Certificate extensions

X.509 v3 extensions are supported and used as indicated in the certificates profiles as described in Algeria PKI – Certificate Templates (see table in clause 7.1).

7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

Algorithms OID conform to IETF RFC 3279 and RFC 5280 (see table in clause 7.1).

7.1.4 Name forms

Name forms are in the X.500 distinguished name form as implemented in RFC 3739.

The Subject Attributes used are provided in the certificate profiles (see table in clause 7.1).

7.1.5 Name constraints

Name constraints are supported as per RFC 5280.

7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier

Certificate policy object identifiers are used as per RFC 3739 and RFC 5280.

OIDs used are provided in the certificates profiles as described in the table in clause 7.1.

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension

Policy Constraints extension is not supported.

7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics

The use of policy qualifiers defined in RFC 5280 is supported.

Used policy qualifiers are provided in the certificates profiles as described in the table in clause 7.1.

7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension

Certificate policies extensions must be processed as per RFC 5280.

7.2 CRL Profile

In conformance with the IETF PKIX RFC 5280, the GOV-CA supports CRLs compliant with:

- Version numbers supported for CRLs
- CRL and CRL entry extensions populated and their criticality.

The GOV-CA's CRL is as follows:

CRL Profile					
Field	CE[2]	O/M[3]	CO[4]	Value	Comment

CertificateList		M			
TBSCertificate					
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier			S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
SignatureValue			D	CA's Signature.	CA's signature value
TbSCertList	False				
Version	False	M			
Version			S	1	Version 2
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier			S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
Issuer	False	M	S		
CountryName				DZ	
OrganizationName				AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE	
CommonName				Government CA	
Validity	False	M			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
thisUpdate			D	<creation time>	
NextUpdate			D	<Creation time> + **[184]** days	
RevokedCertificates	False	O			
Certificate					
CertificateSerialNumber			D	Serial of the revoked certificates	
revocationDate			D	Date when revocation was processed by the CA	UTC time of revocation

crlEntryExtension	False	O			
CRLReason			S	As per RFC 5280	Identifies the reason for the certificate revocation
Invalidity Date			S	Date when the certificate is supposed to be invalid	Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
CRLExtensions	False	M			
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False		D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of subjectPublicKey of the CA public key
CRL Number	False				Sequential CRL Number
AuthorityInfoAccess	False	O			
AccessMethod		O	S	*Id-ad-2 2 id-ad-caIssuers OID i.e.,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 (ca cert)*	CA Issuers field
AccessLocation		O	D	http://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cert/government_ca.p7b	Government CA Certificate/Chain download URL over HTTP

7.2.1   Version number(s)

The GOV-CA supports X.509 version 2 CRLs (see 7.2 above)

7.2.2   CRLand CRL entry extensions

The profile of the CRL is provided in section 7.2 above.

7.3   OCSP Profile

The OCSP profile complies with the requirements of RFC 6960.

The GOV-CA OCSP response signing certificate profile is as follows:

OCSP Response Signing Certificate Profile					
Field	CE[2]	O/M[3]	CO[4]	Value	Comment
Certificate		M			
TBSCertificate		M			See 4.1.2 of RFC 5280

Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	CA's Signature.	CA's signature value
TBSCertificate					
Version	False	M			
Version		M	S	2	Version 3
SerialNumber	False				
CertificateSerialNumber		M	D		At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
Issuer	False	M	S	\<Subordinate Issuing CA's Subject\>	The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type "Name"
CountryName				DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName				AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE	UTF8 encoded
CommonName				Government CA	UTF8 encoded
Validity	False	M			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
NotBefore		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time.	

NotAfter		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time + **[12]** Months	Suggested validity for the OCSP certificate is one year
Subject	False	M	D		
CountryName		M		DZ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName		M		AUTORITE GOUVERNEMENTALE DE CERTIFICATION ELECTRONIQUE	UTF8 encoded
stateOrProvinceName		M	S	Algiers	UTF8 encoded.
CommonName		M		Government CA OCSP	UTF8 encoded
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	RSA	
SubjectPublicKey		M	D	Public Key Key length: 2048 or 4096 (RSA)	
Extensions		M			
Subject Properties					
SubjectKeyIdentifier	False	M			
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of subjectPublicKey
Authority Properties					
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M			Mandatory in all certificates except for self-signed certificates
KeyIdentifier		M	D	SHA-1 Hash	160-bit SHA-1 hash of the issuer CA public key
Policy Properties					
keyUsage	True	M			

digitalSignature		M	S	True	
nonRepudiation		M	S	True	
extKeyUsage	False	M			
id-kp-OCSPSigning		M	S	True	
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck	False	M			
certificatePolicies	False	M			
PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.16.12.3.2.1.1	
policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId		O	S	id-qt 1	
policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri		O	D	https://ca.pki.agce.dz/repository/cps	

7.3.1 Version number(s)

The GOV-CA OCSP responders conform to RFC 6960.

7.3.2 OCSP extensions

No stipulations.

8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment

The AGCE PKI GB ensures that the GOV-CA and the TSPs operations are subject to regular internal audits. These audits are planned and executed, at a minimum, once a year by the PKI GB audit function. This internal audit is part of the PKI GB operational cycle, and remediation for the audit findings is implemented by the CA operations team in a timely manner.

External audits are planned and executed by an independent WebTrust practitioner according to the WebTrust audit scheme. These are organized on a yearly basis by the PMA and apply for the NR-CA operations as well as to the NR-CA subscribing CAs including the GOV-CA.

8.2 Identity / qualifications of assessor

The external audits will be performed by qualified auditors that fulfil the following requirements:

- Independence from the subject of the audit

- Ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria specified in WebTrust for Certification Authorities

- Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining Public Key Infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and third-party attestation function

- Licensed by WebTrust

- Bound by law, government regulation or professional code of ethics

- Except in the case of an Internal Government Auditing Agency, maintains Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with policy limits of at least one million US dollars in coverage

8.3   Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

For internal audit, the AGCE PKI GB audit function is independent of the GOV-CA operations team.

External auditors are independent third party WebTrust practitioners.

8.4   Topics covered by assessment

The GOV-CA is audited for compliance to the following standard:

- AICPA/CICA Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities

Refer to section 8.1 for the periodicity of the audits. Refer to section 8.2 for the assessor's qualifications.

8.5   Actions taken as a result of deficiency

Issues and findings resulting from the assessment are reported to the AGCE PKI GB.

The final audit report includes the issues and findings as well as the agreed corrective action plan and target date for resolution.

The issues and findings are tracked until resolution by the PKI GB. Additional audits are planned and carried out sufficient to reach full compliance.

8.6   Communication of results

The internal audit reports are communicated to the PKI GB and shall not be disclosed to non-authorised third parties.

External audits reports are published on the GOV-CA Public repository.

8.7   Self-audits

The PKI GB, through its compliance function, monitors and strictly controls its adherence to the procedures listed in this CP/CPS document and to the Baseline Requirements by performing self-audits on at least every 6 months. Refer to sections 8.1 and 8.6 for further details.

9   Other Business and Legal Matters

9.1   Fees

9.1.1   Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

Applicable fees, if any, are to be agreed upon by the AGCE and the government TSPs.

9.1.2   Certificate Access Fees

AGCE may not charge for access to issued certificates.

9.1.3   Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

No fee will be charged for Certificate revocation or status information access.

9.1.4   Fees for Other Services

AGCE may charge for other services depending on business needs and subject to AGCE PKI GB approval.

9.1.5 Refund Policy

No refunds for any charged fees.

9.2 Financial Responsibility

9.2.1 Insurance coverage

The AGCE PKI GB ensures that the GOV-CA and AGCE issuing CAs are covered by existing government insurance provisions.

It is the sole responsibility of TSPs to ensure that the CAs issued to them under the GOV-CA are covered by existing government insurance provisions.

9.2.2 Other assets

The AGCE PKI GB maintains sufficient financial resources to support the continuous operations of the GOV-CA (and AGCE issuing CAs) and ensure the fulfilment of the GOV-CA duties as per the provisions of this CP/CPS.

9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

No warranty coverage is available for end entities. Refer to section 9.6.1 for warranties.

9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

The AGCE guarantees the confidentiality of any classified data being the following:

- Subscriber's personal information that are not part of certificates or CRLs issued by the GOV-CA;
- Correspondence between the TSP and the GOV-CA RA during the certificate management processing (including the collected subscribers data) ;
- Contractual agreements between the AGCE and its suppliers;
- AGCE internal documentation (business processes, operational processes, ….);
- Employee confidential information.

9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information

Any information not defined as confidential (refer to section 9.3.1) is deemed public. This includes the information published on the AGCE repository.

9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information

The AGCE protects confidential information through adequate training and policy enforcement with its employees, contractors and suppliers.

9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

9.4.1 Privacy plan

The AGCE observes personal data privacy rules and privacy rules as specified in the present CP/CPS. The AGCE implements these provisions through the GOV-CA RA.

Refer to section 9.4.2 for the scope of private information and to section 9.4.3 for the items that are not considered as private information.

Both private and non-private information can be subject to data privacy rules if the information contains personal data.

Only limited trusted personnel are permitted to access subscribed private information for the purpose of certificate lifecycle management.

The AGCE respects all applicable privacy, private information, and where applicable trade secret laws and regulations, as well as its published privacy policy in the collection, use, retention and disclosure of non-public information.

Private information will not be disclosed by the AGCE to subscribers (TSPs)except for information about themselves and only covered by the contractual agreement between the AGCE and the TSPs.

The AGCE will not release any private information without the consent of the legitimate data owner or explicit authorization by a court order. When the AGCE releases private information, AGCE will ensure through reasonable means that this information is not used for any purpose apart from the requested purposes. Parties granted access will secure the private data from compromise, and refrain from using it or disclosing it to other third-parties. Also, these parties are bound to observe personal data privacy rules in accordance with the relevant laws in the people's democratic republic of Algeria.

All communications channels with the AGCE shall preserve the privacy and confidentiality of any exchanged private information. Data encryption shall be used when electronic communication channels are used with the GOV CA systems. This shall include:

- The communications between the GOV-CA RA systems and the subscribers (TSPs);
- Sessions to deliver certificates.

9.4.2   Information treated as Private

All personal information that is not publicly available in the content of a certificate or CRL are considered as private information.

9.4.3   Information not Deemed Private

Information included in the certificate or CRL is not considered as private.

9.4.4   Responsibility to protect private information

The AGCE employees, suppliers and contractors handle personal information in strict confidence under the AGCE contractual obligations that at least as protective as the terms specified in section 9.4.1.

9.4.5   Notice and consent to use private information

The AGCE ensure that collected personal information is used for the purpose of certificate life cycle management only as consented by the subscribers.

Unless otherwise stated in this CP/CPS, the AGCE Privacy Policy or by agreement, private information will not be used without the consent of the party to whom that information applies.

9.4.6   Disclosure Pursuant Judicial or Administrative Process

The AGCE will not release any private information without the consent of the legitimate data owner or explicit authorization by a court order. Refer to section 9.4.1 for more details.

9.4.7   Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

No stipulation.

9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

The AGCE PKI GB owns and reserves all intellectual property rights associated with the GOV-CA databases, repository, the GOV-CAs digital certificates and any other publication originating from the PKI GB, including this CP/CPS.

The GOV-CA uses software from third-party PKI products suppliers. This software remains the intellectual property of the product suppliers, and its usage by the GOV-CA bound by license agreements between the PKI GB and these suppliers.

9.6 Representations and Warranties

9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

The AGCE warrants that their GOV-CA procedures are implemented in accordance with this CP/CPS, and that any certificates issued under this document are in accordance with the stipulations specified.

By issuing a Certificate, the GOV-CA makes the certificate warranties listed herein to the following Certificate Beneficiaries:

- The Subscriber that is a party to the Subscriber Agreement;
- All Application Software Suppliers with whom the Root CA will enter into a contract for inclusion of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Supplier;
- and all Relying Parties who reasonably rely on a Valid Certificate.

The GOV-CA represents and warrants to the Certificate Beneficiaries that, during the period when the Certificate is valid, the GOV-CA has complied with the Baseline Requirements and its CP/CPS in issuing and managing the Certificate.

The Certificate Warranties specifically include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Right to Use Domain Name or IP Address: Not applicable for the GOV-CA as per the provisions of this CP/CPS;
- Authorization for Certificate: That, at the time of issuance, the GOV-CA (i) implemented a procedure for verifying that the Subject authorized the issuance of the Certificate and that the Applicant Representative is authorized to request the Certificate on behalf of the Subject; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in the GOV-CA's CP/CPS;
- Accuracy of Information: That, at the time of issuance, the GOV-CA (i) implemented a procedure for verifying the accuracy of all of the information contained in the Certificate (with the exception of the subject:organizationalUnitName attribute); (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in the GOV-CA's CP/CPS;
- No Misleading Information: That, at the time of issuance, the GOV-CA (i) implemented a procedure for reducing the likelihood that the information contained in the Certificate's subject:organizationalUnitName attribute would be misleading; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in the GOV-CA's CP/CPS;
- Identity of Applicant: That, if the Certificate contains Subject Identity Information, the CA (i) implemented a procedure to verify the identity of the Applicant in accordance with Sections 3.2 and 11.2; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in the GOV-CA's CP/CPS;
- Subscriber Agreement: That, if the GOV-CA and Subscriber are not Affiliated, the Subscriber and CA are parties to a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber Agreement that satisfies these Requirements, or, if the CA and Subscriber are the same entity or are Affiliated, the Applicant Representative acknowledged the Terms of Use;
- Status: That the GOV-CA maintains a 24 x 7 publicly-accessible Repository with current information regarding the status (valid or revoked) of all unexpired Certificates;
- Revocation: That the GOV-CA will revoke the Certificate for any of the reasons specified in these Requirements

The GOV-CA SHALL be responsible for the performance and warranties of the Subordinate CA, for the Subordinate CA's compliance with these Requirements, and for all liabilities and indemnification obligations of the Subordinate CA under these Requirements, as if the GOV-CA were the Subordinate CA issuing the Certificates.

9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

The AGCE warrants that it performs RA functions as per the stipulations specified in this CP/CPS.

9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

The AGCE warrants that each TSP signs a subscriber's agreement that lists the subscriber's obligations (except for AGCE issuing CAs that are owned and operated by AGCE). The Subscriber agreement enforces the below minimum obligations:

- Secure private key and take reasonable and necessary precautions to prevent loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of the private key. This includes password, hardware token, or other activation data that is used to control access to the Subscriber's private key;
- Use Subscriber Certificate only for its intended uses as specified by this CP/CPS;
- Notify the AGCE in the event of a key compromise immediately whenever the Subscriber has reason to believe that the Subscriber's private key has been lost, accessed by another individual, or compromised in any other manner;
- Use the Subscriber Certificate that does not violate applicable laws in the people's democratic republic of Algeria; and
- Upon termination of Subscriber Agreement, revocation or expiration of the Subscriber Certificate, immediately cease use of the Subscriber Certificate according to the subscriber's termination plan.

The AGCE requires, as part of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use, that the Applicant make the commitments and warranties in this section for the benefit of AGCE and the Certificate Beneficiaries. Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, the AGCE SHALL obtain, for its express benefit and the Certificate Beneficiaries, either:

- The Applicant's agreement to the Subscriber Agreement with the AGCE, or
- The Applicant's acknowledgement of the Terms of Use.

The AGCE implements a process to ensure that each Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use is legally enforceable against the Applicant. In either case, the Agreement MUST apply to the Certificate to be issued pursuant to the certificate request. A separate Agreement is used for each certificate request. The Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use contaisn provisions imposing on the Applicant itself (or made by the Applicant on behalf of its principal or agent under a subcontractor or hosting service relationship) the following obligations and warranties:

- **Accuracy of Information**: An obligation and warranty to provide accurate and complete information at all times to AGCE, both in the certificate request and as otherwise requested by AGCE in connection with the issuance of the Certificate(s) to be supplied by the GOV-CA;

- **Protection of Private Key**: An obligation and warranty by the Applicant to take all reasonable measures to assure control of, keep confidential, and properly protect at all times the Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key to be included in the requested Certificate(s) (and any associated activation data or device, e.g. password or token);

- **Acceptance of Certificate**: An obligation and warranty that the Subscriber will review and verify the Certificate contents for accuracy;

- **Use of Certificate**: To use the Certificate solely in compliance with all applicable laws and solely in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement;

- **Reporting and Revocation**: An obligation and warranty to: (a) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it and its associated Private Key, if there is any actual or suspected misuse or

compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key associated with the Public Key included in the Certificate, and (b) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate;

- **Termination of Use of Certificate**: An obligation and warranty to promptly cease all use of the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key included in the Certificate upon revocation of that Certificate for reasons of Key Compromise.

- **Responsiveness**: An obligation to respond to AGCE instructions concerning Key Compromise or Certificate misuse within a specified time period.

- **Acknowledgment and Acceptance**: An acknowledgment and acceptance that the AGCE is entitled to revoke the certificate immediately if the Applicant were to violate the terms of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use or if revocation is required by the GOV-CA CP/CPS, or the Baseline Requirements.

9.6.4 Relying parties Representations and Warranties

Relying Parties who rely upon the certificates issued under the GOV-CA shall:

- Use the certificate for the purpose for which it was issued, as indicated in the certificate information (e.g., the key usage extension);
- Verify the Validity by ensuring that the Certificate has not Expired;
- Establish trust in the CA who issued a certificate by verifying the certificate path in accordance with the guidelines set by the X.509 Version 3 Amendment;
- Ensure that the Certificate has not been revoked by accessing current revocation status information available at the location specified in the Certificate to be relied upon; and
- Determine that such Certificate provides adequate assurances for its intended use.

9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of other participants

No stipulation.

9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

Within the scope of the law of the people's democratic republic of Algeria, and except in the case of fraud, or deliberate abuse, the AGCE cannot be held liable for:

- The accuracy of any information contained in certificates except as it is warranted by the subscriber that is the party responsible for the ultimate correctness and accuracy of all data transmitted to the GOV-CA with the intention to be included in a CA certificate;
- indirect damage that is the consequence of or related to the use, provisioning, issuance or non-issuance of certificates or digital signatures;
- wilful misconduct of any third-party participant breaking any applicable laws in the people's democratic republic of Algeria, including, but not limited to those related to intellectual property protection, malicious software, and unlawful access to computer systems;
- for any damages suffered whether directly or indirectly as a result of an uncontrollable disruption of the GOV-CA services;
- any form of misrepresentation of information by TSPs or relying parties on information contained in this CP/CPS or any other documentation made public by the AGCE PKI GB and related to the GOV-CA services.

9.8 Limitations of Liability

Limitations on Liability:

- The AGCE will not incur any liability to TSPs or their Subscribers to the extent that such liability results from their negligence, fraud or wilful misconduct;
- The AGCE assumes no liability whatsoever in relation to the use of Certificates or associated Public-Key/Private-Key pairs issued under this CP/CPS for any use other than in accordance with this document. TSPs will immediately indemnify the AGCE from and against any such liability and costs and claims arising there from;
- The AGCE will not be liable to any party whosoever for any damages suffered whether directly or indirectly as a result of an uncontrollable disruption of its services;
- TSPs are liable for any form of misrepresentation of information contained in the certificate to relying parties even though the information has been accepted by AGCE;
- TSP to compensate a Relying Party which incurs a loss as a result of the TSP's breach of Subscriber's agreement;
- Relying Parties shall bear the consequences of their failure to perform the Relying Party obligations; and
- The AGCE denies any financial or any other kind of responsibility for damages or impairments resulting from the GOV-CA operation.

9.9 Indemnities

This CP/CPS does not include any claims of indemnity.

9.10 Term and termination

9.10.1 Term

The present CP/CPS is approved by the AGCE PKI GB and shall remain in force until amendments are published on the PKI GB repository and relevant communication towards TSPs.

9.10.2 Termination

Amendments to this document are applied and approved by the PKI GB and marked by an indicated new version of the document. Upon publishing on the GOV-CA repository, the newer version becomes effective. The older versions of this document are archived by the GOV-CA on its repository.

9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival

The PKI GB coordinates communications towards the TSPs in relation to the termination (and related effects) of this document.

9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants

Notices related to the present CP/CPS may be addressed by TSPs to the PKI GB. Such communications and exchanges may be in writing or electronic. If in writing, the communications and exchanges shall happen using organizations letterhead and signed by the official representatives. Electronic communication may be in emails using the agreed email addresses.

For all other communications, no further stipulation.

9.12 Amendments

9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

The AGCE PKI GB reserves the right to change this CP/CPS as and when needed. The PKI GB will incorporate any such change into a new version of this document and, upon approval, publish the new version. The new document will carry a new version number.

9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

Upon publishing on the GOV-CA repository, the newer version of the CP/CPS becomes effective. The older versions of this document are archived on the GOV-CA repository. The PKI GB coordinates communication towards the TSPs in relation to the amendments of this CP/CPS and related effects.

9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed

Major changes to this CP/CPS that may materially change the acceptability of certificates for specific purposes, may require corresponding changes to the OID or qualifier (URL). The PKI GB shall coordinate proper communication to TSPs.

9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions

All disputes associated with the provisions of this CP/CPS and the GOV-CA services, shall be first addressed by the AGCE PKI GB legal function. If mediation by the PKI GB legal function is not successful, then the dispute shall be escalated to the PMA then further to be adjudicated by the relevant courts of Algeria if the PMA mediation was not successful.

9.14 Governing Law

The laws of the people's democratic republic of Algeria shall govern the enforceability, construction, interpretation, and validity of this CP/CPS.

9.15 Compliance with applicable law

This CP/CPS and provision of GOV-CA certification services are compliant to relevant and applicable laws of the people's democratic republic of Algeria. In particular:

- Law 15-04 fixing "*les règles générales relatives à la signature et à la certification électroniques*" ;
- Décret exécutif N°16-134;
- Décret exécutif N°16-135.

9.16 Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1 Entire Agreement

No stipulation.

9.16.2 Assignment

Except where specified by other contracts, no party may assign or delegate the GOV-CA CP/CPS or any of its rights or duties under this CP/CPS, without the prior written consent of the AGCE.

9.16.3 Severability

If any provision of this CP/CPS is determined to be invalid or unenforceable, the other sections shall remain in effect until this CP/CPS is updated.

In the event of a conflict between the Baseline Requirements and any regulation in Algeria, the AGCE may modify any conflicting requirement to the minimum extent necessary to make the requirement valid and legal in Algeria. This applies only to operations or certificate issuances that are subject to that Law. In such event, the AGCE will immediately (and prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) include in this section a detailed reference to the Law requiring a modification of the Baseline Requirements under this section, and the specific modification to the Baseline Requirements implemented by the AGCE. The AGCE will also (prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) notify the CA/Browser Forum of the relevant information newly added to its CP/CPS. Any modification to the AGCE practice enabled under this section will be discontinued if and

when the Law no longer applies, or the Baseline Requirements are modified to make it possible to comply with both them and the Law simultaneously. An appropriate change in practice, modification to this CP/CPS and a notice to the CA/Browser Forum, as outlined above, is made within 90 days.

9.16.4 Enforcement (Attorney Fees/Waiver of Rights)

No stipulation.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

The AGCE shall not be liable for any failure or delay in their performance under the provisions of this CP/CPS due to causes that are beyond their reasonable control., including, but not limited to unavailability of interruption or delay in telecommunications services.

9.17 Other Provisions

No stipulation.